17

APRIL 1988

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

NEW TIMES

Alexei Gherman:
Films and thoughts


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Learning from Lenin

China's foreign policy

IGNATY NIVINSKY

A sketch for the poster "The Red Lightning," 1919

NEW TIMES

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Editor-in-chief
VITALY IGNATENKO

Associate editors:
L. ABRAMOV,
L. BEZYMENSKY,
V. CHERNYAVSKY,
V. GANYUSHKIN,
S. GOLYAKOV,
V. KULISTIKOV,
L. MLECHIN,
A. PIN,
D. POGORZHELSKY,
A. PUMPYANSKY,
Y. SHEVCHENKO,
V. STARSHINOV

Designer I. Shein

Editor of English edition:
E. Smirnov

After almost six years of difficult negotiations, the package of agreements on a political settlement in Afghanistan has been signed at last. This event marks the victory of a new political thinking, which has not come easy. The long-awaited peace will come to that ancient land if the Geneva accords are fulfilled, and the guarantees undertaken abided by.
See pp. 5-11.

CONTENTS:

2
Glasnost

4
Highlight of the week

5
Afghanistan
Abdul Wakil.
A VITAL MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

8
Yuri Kosinsky.
THE FINISHING TOUCH
Rais Tuzmukhamedov.
THE GUARANTEES TO BE ABIDED BY

9
Vadim Okulov.
APRIL, A MONTH OF HOPE

12
In search of the future
Sergei Golyakov.
MAURICE STRONG'S PLAN

13
Disarmament problems
Alexei Bukalov.
THE DOOR OPEN TO CONTROL

15
U.S.A.
Victor Yevgenyev.
THE CANDIDATE FROM BOSTON

16
U.S.S.R. — U.S.A.
Evgeny Andrianov,
Felix Goryunov.
IS A BREAKTHROUGH POSSIBLE?

18
Reflections
Leonid Ionin.
HE WHO WANTED TO DO GOOD

21
U.S.S.R.:
Perestroika and Democracy
Evgeny Torkanovsky.
WHO HAS THE FINAL SAY!

23
Perestroika: A view from abroad
Artur Bodnar.
DRAWING UPON EACH OTHER'S EXPERIENCE

25
China
Evgeny Bazhanov.
SHIFTS OF EMPHASES

29
Art
Alexei Gherman.
LET'S FACE THE TRUTH

32
Culture and politics
Leonid Mlechin.
EVEN BAD BOOKS ARE WORTH READING

Cover
by A. Levitsky

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TOMMY J. DUNHAM

Tübingen, F.R.G.

■ I have just finished reading Mr. Gorbachev's book on perestroika and would like to share my concerns with you about the state of world affairs today. I will try to be brief.

I am an American student of German studies and political science presently studying for a year in Tübingen. I was born to a German mother and an American father, who at the time was a soldier in the American army in West Berlin. I was raised in the United States, but have lived in the Federal Republic for the past five years, most of that time in West Berlin.

Growing up in the United States, I was exposed to the portrayal of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" from early on. I learned it from my parents: my father was serving in the army in Berlin when the wall was erected and he believed himself a true defender of liberty. We children were to inherit this world, which had already come to the brink of atomic war and seemed poised to do so again.

Although the injustices of your society were paraded in front of me, the injustices of mine were well hidden. I completed my high-school education without once being required to read Marx, Engels or Lenin. We were briefly told of a system where one only received what one needed, regardless of capability or productivity, and that the bare essentials were all that were received. And, of course, that this system was bent on world domination. In our society, I was told, a good worker could earn enough to fulfil his dreams, and it was only the lazy who were left out of the riches to be had. It wasn't until later that I learned that this wasn't true, that unemployment is necessary for capitalism. I also learned that while we had it so good, thousands upon thousands were starving the world over. The consumption of material goods was and is an ethic with us. The more one can consume, the more prestigious one is. I wonder how many people I could have kept alive on the money I had spent maintaining a car when I was 16.

It seems to me that although my country enjoys a great deal of individual rights, it is blind to the economic injustices it incurs around it. Not only do we have little respect for the poverty and desperation in the Third World, we have no idea of what we are going to do when the natural resources run out. We live today at the expense of the welfare of our children. There is no doubt in my mind that an economic restructuring of our own will take place in the United States, sooner or later, we are all going to have to learn to live with less.

How this economic restructuring will look is anybody's guess. If we continue to be shortsighted it will be chaos. Socialism could offer an alternative, in theory it could provide a relatively fair distribution of resources. But it is my concern that socialism and individual rights are not compatible. If it could be shown that the two are compatible, the main source of the conflict, at least in the eyes of the average Western citizen, would fade away. It may well be that socialism is inevitable. But in order for this system to be acceptable, it has to prove itself responsive not only to economic injustice, but also to individual rights.

Undertaking a great social experiment, you also express your concern for the welfare of our planet and her future inhabitants. It is my hope that political and economic injustice may some day be overcome, and that these ideals become the guiding light of our common future.

GLASNOST FROM OUR MAILBAG

MIKHAIL SHEMYAKIN

artist, New York, U.S.A.

■ The conclusion of an agreement that will result in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is an unforgettable event for every Russian who is genuinely concerned about the future of his great much-suffering Motherland. As an act of peace reducing world political tension, it will evoke a sigh of relief from the parents who have lived all these years in a state of poignant grief and anxious expectation of the happy news which came on April 14.

From the bottom of my heart I congratulate the happy families who will soon embrace their courageous sons, and in my mind lay flowers at the graves of the soldiers who died in a foreign land, as has happened before in the history of our state. May their memory live forever... The agreement on Afghanistan is a result of the policy pursued by a wonderful man, Mikhail Gorbachev, and his close associates. May they have God's blessings forever.

Another event, incomparable in its significance with the conclusion of an agreement on Afghanistan, took place recently in the cultural life of Russia. I have in mind the opening of the Salvador Dali exhibition in Moscow. This reflected, to my mind, the desire to reappraise the contributions made by world-famous artists to the treasure-house of our civilization. Such an approach should, I think, be combined with the rejection of artists who lack individuality but who posed for many years as the real and only representatives of Russian art.

Salvador Dali's exhibition in the Soviet Union will, in my opinion, enable people to familiarize themselves with the creative work of an artist who reflected the contradictions and dramatic nature of our complex age in his own characteristic manner. To see the world as Dali does means to see its sharp, cutting edges. Dali was married to a Russian, Yelena Dyakonova (Gala), and in this way he became related to Russia. Among his works I would like to note "Six apparitions of Lenin on a grand piano," which impressed me very much.

What have the two events in common — the signing of the agreement on the Afghan question and the exhibition of Dali's works? They might seem to be of different kinds only at first glance. In fact, there is an inherent connection between them. Both of them are a result of new thinking.

YOUR COMMENTS INVITED

GLASNOST

FROM OUR MAILBAG

From the editors: The attitude to perestroika in the Soviet Union, the obstacles in its way, and problems rooted in our past is the subject of the discussion started by our readers Silvio Sarzi-Sartori and Gerhard Roth in issue No. 15/88. Below are more letters on this subject.

SERGEI RUBTSOV, 25
Novokuznetsk, U.S.S.R.

■ Fighting dogmatism and inertia and advocating glasnost, we must study our past thoroughly. How did mass repression become possible in the years of the personality cult? It is often explained by Stalin's maniacal suspicion. But that is only a small part of the truth. I have never yet read a profound analysis of the objective and subjective reasons. I want to know the truth about the pain and tragedy of my people, and not for malignant gossip, speculation, or the search for sensation, but because it is my mother country, because I love it and want socialism to be freed of everything that oppresses it.

What I want is more light.

V. SHKVAL
Krasnoyarsk, U.S.S.R.

■ The Stalin personality cult was a crime, and we must do everything to expose the culprits, both living and dead, so that this tragedy can never be repeated.

In our time of glasnost and democratization, the hushing up and, even worse, justification of the personality cult is nothing more than a betrayal of the victims of Stalinism, the crimes committed before the party and the people. It is an attempt to undermine perestroika.

The press must give a profound scientific explanation of the personality cult, drawing on the best journalists, writers and historians for the purpose.

A. CHISTOV
Shevchenko, U.S.S.R.

■ The party took a bold step in telling the people the truth about Stalin. It was not easy to accept this truth then, and not everyone believed it, because they had been brainwashed for many years. Can it really be that some people do not yet understand the harm done to our people by the personality cult and the fact that all our achievements have been made in spite of, and not thanks to it.

V. ANTONENKO
Kiev, U.S.S.R.

■ I think that our press writes little about the period in our history known as the Stalin personality cult. Journalists must tell the people about the outstanding party leaders and statesmen who have been rehabilitated as a result of the work carried out by the CPSU Political Bureau's commission.

I. NIKOLOV
Murmansk, U.S.S.R.

■ Our media carry information about certain negative phenomena in the life of our society. But they do not show the causes for these ugly phenomena. Indeed, they cannot be attributed to imperialism or tsardom. They were engendered by our society. The causes of our failings, and the precrisis conditions, must be thoroughly examined. Only in this way can success be achieved. It is not enough to state the facts. It is necessary to suggest ways of moving forward, drawing on the lessons of our history.

KURT SINGHUBER
Berlin, G.D.R.

■ In the process of the revolutionary changes in your country better known as perestroika, it is becoming increasingly necessary for the party to fight unremittingly against social sclerosis. The spirit and mission of the October Revolution, diluted by several decades of bureaucratic oppression and stagnation, are now being revived. Many difficulties have arisen. But this does not mean that the revolution is on the ebb. Theoretically, all these evils are alien to socialism. Nevertheless, they exist and, as materialists and dialecticians, we must fight them without waiting for results from the passive repetition of slogans which thus lose their meaning.

E. ARKHIPOVA
CPSU member
and veteran worker
Kamensk, U.S.S.R.

■ Our propaganda must be not only truthful but also constructive and businesslike. We should not go to extremes: either to praising everything unreservedly, or denying our previous historic experience without any ground whatever. Democracy is not anarchy or arbitrary rule. The ideological standard of critical articles must be very high. The shortcomings should be discussed, but in a reasonable way. It is essential to reveal their causes and, most importantly, to suggest ways for further advance.

AN ARTIST'S COMMENT

"We must not neglect the grassroots" Cartoon by A. Orekhov

HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK

PRIVATE OPINION

GARY HART

I regard the signing of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan as an extremely important event. This conflict was one of the barriers between our countries.

When I spoke with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow in December 1986 Mr Gorbachev said: "We are attempting to resolve the Afghanistan conflict." And he has done so, it appears. The agreement has become a reality.

Your government has done a great deal of work to achieve this, and we Americans ought to contribute to this atmosphere of cooperation and mutual understanding in Afghanistan.

ROBERT LICHAL, Minister of National Defence, Austria

When the news of the conclusion of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan was flashed around the world, I was in Moscow at the invitation of Defence Minister Dmitry Yazov. Of course, the Geneva documents and the development of the situation need careful study. But, unquestionably, the signing of the Geneva package is an important event.

Austria is prepared, if necessary, to send observers to help in the implementation of these agreements. Having pledged 33 years ago to maintain permanent neutrality, it has rendered assistance in the settlement of various international conflicts and has repeatedly dispatched troops for the U.N. international peace-keeping force.

The settlement of the Afghan problem will certainly influence East-West relations and the all-European process. The defusing of conflicts and crises has always had a beneficial effect on the international situation as a whole.

IRINA CHICHERINA, New Times proofreader

The news of the Afghan settlement and of our government's practical steps towards the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has become for me, one of the thousands of Soviet mothers, the most important event of the month, if not the year.

For two years my son Maxim served with the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan, and during this time I did not have a single peaceful night. I understood that he had to be there, but my heart ached. I am grateful to fate that my son, having fulfilled his military duty with honour, has returned home safe and sound. But not all have been as lucky.

I don't know whether I have the right to speak on behalf of other women, but I shall say on my own behalf: this must never happen again. May no mother ever know how it feels to have her son under fire.

NABIL AMROU, representative extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Soviet Union

The assassination in Tunis of Abu Djihad, deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Palestinian revolution, has come as a shock to us Palestinians. The PLO has lost one of its leaders, an ardent fighter for the restoration of the flouted rights of our people.

As we now know, the decision to kill Abu Djihad was taken in the upper echelons of the Israeli leadership and executed on their orders. Raphael Eitan, the Israeli chief of General Staff, has said that the operation was carried out in cooperation with the Israeli air force and navy.

We also know that the United States gave assistance in the operation. We regard this action as an attempt to break the spirit of our people, who are continuing the uprising in the occupied territories. But those who masterminded the assassination have miscalculated. Our people have stepped up their struggle against the Israeli occupation. Unfortunately, the number of Palestinians killed in the uprising has increased over the past few days. But our people are ready for greater sacrifices in this struggle. They are firmly resolved to continue it.

Israel is making futile attempts to put down the uprising by armed force. It will continue until the Palestinians win their legitimate right to establish their own independent state.

Looking forward to peace



War-ravaged Afghanistan has been given hope by the agreements on a political settlement signed in Geneva on April 14.

Abdul Wakil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, answers New Times' questions.

How did the Geneva talks go?

What are the Soviet Union's and the United States' obligations under the international guarantees they have undertaken?

What's the situation in Afghanistan today?

EXCLUSIVE FOR NEW TIMES

Abdul Wakil:

A vital mission accomplished

On his way back from Geneva to Kabul, after the exhausting negotiations, the Afghan Foreign Minister stopped over in Moscow. Despite his fatigue he kindly agreed to give an interview to New Times correspondent Alexander Usvatov.

New Times. Mr Wakil, now that the Geneva marathon, during which the conditions for a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan were drawn up, has ended, I should like to put a few questions to you as a direct participant in the talks. When did you first become involved in the negotiations?

Abdul Wakil. Afghan-Pakistani negotiations through a U.N. mediator began in Geneva in June 1982. So almost 6 years elapsed between that date and the signing of the document on April 14. Personally, I joined the talks in February 1987, after my appointment in December 1986 as Afghanistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs (before that Abdul Wakil, a Kabul University graduate in economics, had for several years held the post of Finance Minister, and then that of ambassador to Vietnam—Ed.)

N.T. What stage of the talks would you say was the most difficult?

A.W. The whole course of the negotiations was from the outset extremely difficult. Each step towards agreement was achieved with great difficulty. Nevertheless, none of these difficulties can be compared, in my opinion, with those that cropped up at the last stage of the talks, when the question was whether they would be completed successfully, or whether they would collapse. At the last stage, that is from March 2, the fate of the talks hung in the balance. There was a moment when it seemed that the obstacles that had sprung up could not be overcome. The tough stand taken by the other side almost brought the talks to an impasse. At that time the documents that have now been signed were almost completely ready. When at the beginning of this final round we named the date for the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the deadlines for the different stages in which it was to be carried out we cleared the way for the completion of the Geneva process. However, Pakistan and the U.S. chose that moment to put forward new proposals, new conditions that went beyond the framework of the agenda of the talks. That completely contradicted the existing understanding that new issues, not included in the agenda, would not be raised.

N.T. Nonetheless, common sense prevailed. How many times did you and your Pakistani colleague have to sign your names to the copies of the Geneva documents?

A.W. 45 times.

N.T. And the two of you met for the first time in the hall where the signing ceremony took place?

A.W. Yes. We had insisted from the outset on direct negotiations. Unfortunately, our partners refused. That is why the mediation of Diego Cordovez was required. The Afghan and Pakistani delegations always occupied separate premises, and it was only on the last day that we found ourselves in the same hall.

N.T. Did you shake hands?

A.W. We were ready to, but you can't shake a hand that is not held out to you. The protocol of the signing ceremony prepared by U.N. staff did not envisage the participants shaking hands. And that, you understand, was deliberate.

N.T. What in your opinion is the significance of the Geneva package?

A.W. All the documents that make up the package are very important. They are interrelated and, taken together, create the conditions for a settlement of the external aspects of the Afghan problem. But I must say that for us the most fundamental and important one is the Afghan-Pakistani agreement on the principles of mutual relations, specifically, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and non-intervention. The main principles of international law laid down in them will make it possible to normalize bilateral relations. Observance of these principles should serve to put an end to any outside interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and prevent any recurrence of such interference in the future. This agreement is in the interest of both countries—not just Afghanistan, but Pakistan equally. The joint Soviet-American declaration on international guarantees should help to implement the principles of the first agreement.

N.T. Any agreement requires compromises and mutual concessions from the two sides. Do you consider your government to have achieved the main goals you set yourself when you went to Geneva?

A.W. Mutual compromises are of course necessary. But there also exists a certain limit beyond which one cannot go. I believe that we can be

The agreements being signed in the Council Chamber of Geneva's Palais des Nations.

satisfied that we have achieved our main goal: although we were ready to compromise in order to lead the talks out of the impasse, we at the same time did not yield on the principles and values that are of enduring significance to us as an idependent nation. I should like to say that it was the Afghan side that made the greatest concessions and displayed the greatest flexibility in order to save the negotiations from failure. The main objective has thus been achieved: peaceful external conditions have been ensured around Afghanistan. And seeking peace within the country is the Afghan's own affair.

N.T. Why do you think the Peshawar extremists are rejecting the Geneva agreements? After all, these agreements provide for the withdrawal from Afghanistan of the Soviet troops that they have always described as "occupying forces" and whose withdrawal they sought.

A.W. Of course, it would be better to put that question to them. But I can say that only those who do not want an end to the war on our soil and who want the bloodshed to continue can reject the Geneva agreements. In other words, those who feel no responsibility for the future of the country and the fate of the nation. Those who lack political wisdom and perception; finally, those who, in effect, do not cherish our national and Islamic values, no matter what they say to the contrary.

Nevertheless, we hope that certain sections and elements from the ranks of the opposition will gradually come to recognize and accept the objective reality achieved as a result of the signing of the Geneva agreements. As for the handful of the most extremist leaders of the opposition who reject the agreements outright, as time goes by they will find themselves increasingly isolated. The entire people of Afghanistan and all countries and nations that support the political settlement of the long-drawn-out conflict in our region will turn their backs on them, because the Geneva agreements lay a firm foundation for accelerating the process of national reconciliation and achieving national accord.

N.T. There was a report that Diego Gordovez would mediate between the Afghan government and the opposition for the purpose of setting up a coalition government in Afghanistan. Is there any truth in such reports?

A.W. We firmly maintain that the process of national reconciliation and achieving national accord, and the formation of a coalition is the sole prerogative of the Afghan people themselves. But at the same time, if anyone who took part in the Geneva talks were to offer his good offices to help and cooperate in bringing this about, we would naturally have no objections. That is why we would welcome any personal initiative on the part of Señor Cordovez in establishing contacts between us and the opposition. After all, he has tremendous experience in arranging contacts on the most difficult problems. He is very patient and persistent. He has taken part in many U.N. efforts to resolve conflict situations in different parts of the world. But his greatest real success was in his mediating mission on Afghanistan. However, it should be underlined that this success was possible first and foremost thanks to the flexibility and political will of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Our partners in the talks—Pakistan and the U.S.—should greatly value our constructive attitude, just, as, in the final count, we value their attitude, which made it possible to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.

N.T. Now about the refugees. Everything is clear with regard to the return of refugees from Pakistan—that is covered by a special agreement. But what about the refugees now in Iran, which took no part in the Geneva talks? Have there been any contacts with Teheran on this matter?

A.W. The agreement on the return of refugees concerns all Afghans outside Afghanistan, no matter in which country they are at present, including of course Iran. The document was signed by Pakistan, because that is where the largest number of refugees live and, incidentally, in intolerable conditions. And it is there that they are being manipulated most. Although the Iranians did not take part in the Geneva talks, they nevertheless informed Señor Cordovez that they would accept some of the obligations to be drawn up for Pakistan. We hope that will indeed be the case. As you know, refugees in Iran had begun gradually returning to Afghanistan even before the Geneva agreements were signed, and we expect most of them to return to their homes in the nearest future.

N.T. Will the U.N. missions working on repatriation operate not only on the border with Pakistan, but also that with Iran?

A.W. In keeping with the documents signed in Geneva, special practical agreements are expected to be concluded between the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and Pakistan and Afghanistan. Judging from the preliminary talks I had on two occasions in Geneva with M. Hocké, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, his agency will also concern itself with Afghan refugees in Iran, and in other countries as well.

N.T. At the Tashkent meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Najibullah, it was underlined that Soviet-Afghan relations are now entering a new stage. How would you describe the main features of this stage, and what is new about it?

A.W. I believe that Soviet-Afghan cooperation will be extended in all fields: economic, social, scientific, technological and cultural. All that is begin-

ning to be implemented even before the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The new features are already being manifested in our bilateral relations. Thus the Soviet Union has begun cooperating with the private sector in Afghanistan, setting up joint enterprises with our businessmen. Direct ties are being actively established between Soviet republics and regions and Afghan provinces, between Soviet and Afghan towns. That too is a new form of contact.

So that will constitute a new higher level in the all-round friendly relations between our two countries, with one exception: there will be no Soviet troops on Afghan territory. It is common knowledge that close friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan are a tradition which had its beginning in the days of Lenin and Amanullah Khan.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that the Afghan people passionately want peace and tranquillity. They are tired of the protracted bloodshed and war. The agreements signed in Geneva do not automatically bring peace to our country. But they do create all the necessary external conditions for the establishment of peace on Afghan soil as quickly as possible.

Interviewer **ALEXANDER USVATOV**

The finishing touch

Report from Geneva

On the evening of April 8, the U.N. mediator at the indirect Afghan-Pakistani talks, Diego Cordovez, hastily called together the journalists accredited to the Geneva Palais des Nations and announced that all the difficulties had been overcome and the agreements forming the international legal foundation for a political settlement on Afghanistan had been prepared for signing. "The signing of the agreements is planned for April 12 or 14, but on no account for April 13," declared Cordovez to laughter from the hall.

The morning of April 14 was an equally busy time both for the U.N. staff in Geneva and all who had arrived for the ceremony. Newsmen too were in a flurry. About 200 of them—from the press and TV together with photo correspondents—had gathered at the Palais des Nations, but the coveted passes, green plastic cards with the U.N. emblem and the inscription "Council Chamber," could be issued to only 80. Taking into account the recommendations of the U.N. security service, and wishing to safeguard the participants in the ceremony from any unpleasant surprises, the palace administration had chosen the comparatively small Council Chamber for the signing ceremony.

As one of the lucky possessors of a green card opening the way to the Council Chamber, I, thoroughly checked by the security guards, passed through horseshoe-shaped gates like metal detectors, and at last found myself in a cosy hall. The greater part of it was taken up by a ring-shaped table. Through the huge windows was a lovely view of the old cedar trees that surround the palace. They stood out clearly against the background of the blue waters of Lake Leman, locally referred to as Lake of Geneva. U.N. security staff stood along the walls, about 10-15 metres from each other. All were dressed in blue parade uniform and wore white gloves.

Since newsmen had been instructed to take their places 45 minutes before the beginning of the signing ceremony, we were able to watch the preparations at our leisure. Staff of the U.N. Protocol placed five green cloth bookrests at equal distances from each other on the table, then a thick folder with the texts of the agreements, and next to it a pen and an old-fashioned paperweight. Then five flags—those of the U.N., Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States—were put in front of each place and the five carved high-backed chairs. A little further away were the seats for the delegates accompanying each of the participants in the signing ceremony. At 14:25 Geneva time, the U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, accompanied by Diego Cordovez, entered the hall.

The U.N. Secretary-General took a seat with his back to the window, at the central place marked by the U.N. flag. His entrance was followed by the simultaneous entrance of the heads of the delegations at the Afghan-Pakistani talks. The Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil seated himself to the right of the U.N. Secretary-General and Pakistan's State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zain Noorani, to the left. They were followed by the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz who also entered simultaneously. The first sat to the right of Mr Wakil, and the second to the left of Mr Noorani. The U.N. Secretary-General announced the purpose of the ceremony and invited the participants to get down to signing the documents.

After the staff of the Protocol had checked that all the documents had indeed been signed, Perez de Cuellar made a brief statement thanking all who had helped make the talks a success.

The guarantees to be abided by...

Commentary by a legal expert

Though I have been in Afghanistan many times, my mood is now entirely different, inasmuch as at last agreements providing for tangible prospects of peace in this long-suffering land have just been signed in Geneva. My colleagues and I are going to Afghanistan to attend a tripartite conference where, in collaboration with U.S. and Afghan political scientists, we shall be discussing ways and means of implementing the Geneva accords.

The Geneva package contains what I sensed to be essential. I mean the U.S.A.'s real involvement in peace-making guarantees in and around Afghanistan. This briefest of the four elements in the package, to wit the U.S.-U.S.S.R. declaration on international guarantees, appears to me to possess the greatest significance, insofar as it lays down what the U.S. administration's attitude so conspicuously lacked before the agreements were signed.

In this document the United States, together with ourselves, has assumed th juridical commitment firstly to refrai unreservedly from interference and in tervention in any form in the interna affairs of either Afghanistan or Pakista and, secondly, to respect the commi ments that these two countries have as sumed in their basic bilateral agreemer on the principles of their relationshi and more specifically the principles c non-interference and non-intervention.

What does an international guarante imply? It is an international legal com mitment pledging either that somethin will be done or, on the contrary, the nothing will be done with regard to th states stipulated by the agreement. C it may imply the observance c guarantees to preserve the stipulate status of a state, of its territory and s on. The history of international guaran tees is of long standing. Thus, th present generation will no doub recall the guarantees given by the fiv nuclear powers for Latin America's nu



He called on members of the world community to give Afghanistan every assistance at this critical moment in its history.

The ceremony took exactly twenty minutes, and ended with the U.N. Secretary-General shaking hands with each of the four ministers who had signed the agreements.

YURI KOSINSKY

April, a month of hope

Report from Kabul

Towards the end of 1986, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) radically revised its policy, taking the line of national reconciliation and a compromise with the opposition forces. The Soviet leadership justly made its decision to withdraw the troops from that country conditional on guaranteed non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs from outside.

The drawing up and signing of the Geneva agreements has sharply intensified centrifugal processes in the Afghan émigré camp opposed to the present government: previously, it was the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan that held it together. The reshuffles of the leadership of the Peshawar Union of the Seven resulted not only from internal rivalry for power. The moderate and more sober-minded elements of the opposition began to dissociate themselves from the extremist top. For instance, Haji Gausuddin, the leader of the Three Moderate Parties organization, which settled in India, packed up and returned to Kabul recently to negotiate the formation of coalition government bodies. The commanders of the "second echelon" armed anti-government units operating on the republic's territory are now to bring life back to normal in the areas under their control and start peaceful construction there. Wouldn't they be well-advised to cooperate with the government in Kabul, which has accumulated ten years of experience of such work?

The sacrifices were not in vain

What has the decade since the April Revolution of 1978 brought?

To begin with, the national democratic revolution has held out and, despite all the sacrifices involved, won the broad popular masses over to its side. The republic's armed forces have improved their capacity for defending the gains of the April Revolution. For all the enormous wartime difficulties, the country's national economy did make progress, with substantial Soviet assistance.

The republic has built a political infrastructure of society in which the PDPA has the role of the initiator and conductor of the national reconciliation policy. For the sake of ending the bloodshed, it has performed an act of immense civil courage, waiving its monopoly rule, transforming Afghanistan's system of government and changing over to a multiparty political system and a mixed economy. These principles are enshrined in the new Constitution of the republic adopted by the Loya Jirgah late last year.

These are, of course, the most general results of the past decade. The same

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ear-free status by signing the appnded protocols to the Tlatelolco eaty which, in 1967, paved the way the denuclearization of the region. hen, in 1985, the member states of the uth Pacific forum signed the Rarongа Treaty to make their own region clear-free, they asked the same five wers to furnish guarantees to this end. wever, only the U.S.S.R. and the ople's Republic of China agreed to do The other three powers, unhappily, clined.

We are all familiar with the ups and wns of the Afghan crisis and the other gional conflicts in the world today. e salient feature of these conflicts is t forces, which are not infrequently ographically remote from the region which the conflict has occurred, are rly deeply involved. Hence, if we w things from a realistic angle, no litical solution is conceivable without ing into consideration and balancing interests of all the forces involved. e fact that we find the legal instrunt of international guarantees in the ghan settlement is a factor indicating t Afghanistan may be of major signince in achieving a breakthrough the chain of regional conflicts.

The international guarantor bears a mendous responsibility, especially wadays when the world is increasing- interconnected, and when, moreover, this relates to flashpoints. It bears a responsibility to its own people and to the whole international community. I say this not only as an expert on international law, but as an individual who remembers the second world war and who has seen for himself what took place—indeed is still taking place!—in Afghanistan. I simply cannot understand how one can sign an international act that commits one not to intervene, and immediately follow it up with a public statement, as U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and President Ronald Reagan did, to the effect that they will continue to supply arms to ("aid") the leaders of the Peshawar Seven, who have refused to recognize the Geneva agreements and who repudiate the very possibility of national reconciliation and coalition.

The road to the package and the guarantees was a long and arduous one. There were the inevitable compromises. Until eventually a common denominator was worked out and the interests of the parties concerned were balanced. This paved the way from the angle of international law for the Afghans themselves to be able to decide their own affairs. Hence the guarantors are mandated to honour the commitments they have so recently voluntarily assumed.

RAIS TUZMUKHAMEDOV,
professor of international law

years witnessed, unfortunately, not a few errors and leftist excesses. There were cases of rushing things—or, on the contrary, of marking time. That was caused by a number of factors: the rudimentary nature of the social structure, strongly manifest tribal relations, and almost wholesale illiteracy. Another factor was the absence of genuine unity in the PDPA, which at times took on extreme forms. The failure of the land and water reform had adverse socio-economic consequences; far from solving the agrarian problem it turned middle peasants against the revolution.

However, the party has succeeded in rectifying its mistakes and blunders.



Soviet experts generously share their experience with Afghan colleagues.

Their internationalist duty fulfilled, Soviet servicemen are leaving Afghanistan.

Kabul's shops are open from morning till night.

Photos by Sharif Latifi (Afghanistan) and A. Khrupov (TASS)

Land and water relations are now being adjusted on new and reasonable principles, in the interests of the broad peasant masses. Last year's party-wide conference proved a landmark in the consolidation of forces within the PDPA. Some party leaders and statesmen are overcoming the confusion into which the problems involved in carrying out the national reconciliation policy have thrown them into.

The military-political situation in the country remains tense. The increase of American and other Western arms supplies to extremist anti-government groupings threatens to aggravate it even further. Nevertheless, almost eighteen months of bold efforts towards dialogue and compromise, towards national reconciliation, are yielding fruit. According to President Najibullah, a quarter of Afghans are now living in provinces, districts and villages where peace has been established.

They voted for peace

"We support the national reconciliation policy, which coincides with the ideals of Islam," Kari Abdul Sattar Sirak, Chairman of the People's Islamic Party, told me the other day. "The Geneva agreements on settling the external aspects of the Afghan problem and stopping foreign interference in our affairs should be of real help in putting an end to bloodshed and the fratricidal war on our soil...."

The party led by Sirak is now in its formative stage and seeks to come to the fore on the political scene. It already cooperates with the central government at village, district and provincial level. But not exclusively so. At the recent elections to the National Council (Parliament) of Afghanistan, it nominated eleven candidates for both chambers —the Senate and the People's Chamber.

The campaign, held on April 5-15, gave Afghans their first ever chance to elect the supreme legislative body on the basis of direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. This distinguishes the recent parliamentary elections from those conducted under the king. According to the Central Election Commission, more than 1.5 million of Afghans took part in the elections. And this with the undeclared war still being waged!

234 deputies to the People's Chamber and two thirds (128) of the Senators were elected, and the remaining third appointed by the President. Fourteen parties and public organizations, among them the PDPA and other parties of the left democratic bloc, the Peasant Justice Party and the People's Islamic Party will be represented in the National Council. In certain constituencies, one parliamentary seat was contested by up to seven candidates.

The opposition was offered a fair chance at the elections: it was able to put forward its candidates in all constituencies without exception. In accordance with the Constitution and the elections law, 25 per cent of Senate seats were reserved for the opposition.

During the elections I visited many polling stations, interviewed a number of voters, and satisfied myself that all of them gave one common mandate to their candidates: to have the fratricidal war on their soil stopped. The elections' slogan was "peace and security through national reconciliation." The candidates for parliament were all for that programme.

I had a talk with Roshan Tseran, nominated by the Women's Union of Afghanistan, who arrived at the polling station in mourning for her dead officer husband.

"If I am elected," she said with intense emotion, "I shall uphold the interests of the ordinary people. Shall I be able to reconcile myself to those who caused by husband's death? For the sake of my son and my daughter, for

he sake of peace in the country—yes! We need peace. Peace. Nothing but eace...."

The National Council is presently to ndorse the composition of the coun- y's government and the programme of s work. In this way, the key elements f the state structure, reflecting the ealities of the national reconciliation rocess, will be formed. Together with ocal government and administrative odies, each of them increasingly taking n the character of a coalition, they are o tackle a vital national problem nsuing from the Geneva agreements— o provide conditions for the return ome of millions of refugees now being eld in Pakistan and Iran for the most art.

"Even granted that people will be oming back at a rate of a million a ear," Mohammad Hassan Sharq, Deputy rime Minister and Chairman of the State ommittee for Refugee Affairs, told me, they'll need 150,000 tons of grain nd enormous amounts of other products nd commodities. Every returnee costs s 10,000-15,000 afghanis. Nearly 30,000 efugees will be on the road every day. ransporting them will take no less than thousand vehicles. Our own resources re far from adequate, of course... lmost everything we needed to take are of the 120,000-odd emigrants who eturned home over the past year was rovided by the Soviet Union as free id. The intention voiced by the Soviet nion in the Tashkent Soviet-Afghan tatement of April 7 to go on giving us a and in settling returnees is heartening. We have also applied to the United Nations, and Jean Pierre Hocké, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, has ssured us that the United Nations is repared to help us. We have likewise received assurances from the International Red Cross.

The commander's story

Soviet servicemen on their internationalist mission in Afghanistan are naturally enthusiastic about the news that the Geneva package has been signed, as I had occasion to see when visiting a number of units of the limited Soviet troop contingent in Afghanistan (LSTC).

"It's great knowing we're going home soon!" the boys told me.

"How are you preparing to leave here?" I asked the LSTC commander.

"Very intensively," the general replied. "The pullout has a technical as well as a political side to it, and the problems involved are not easy. We are to hand over our deployment zones and fully-equipped camps to Afghan army units. We are now training Afghan electricians, plumbers and signalmen. Some of the well-appointed premises we're leaving behind will be used as classrooms, boarding schools, hospitals, and cultural institutions.

"In the meantime," the general went on, "we are still carrying out combat missions, such as protecting population centres, civil structures, communication lines, intercepting and destroying arms caravans infiltrating from Pakistan—their number is not diminishing yet.

"There is another and no less important aspect of our internationalist mission. We are distributing Soviet aid—food supplies and prime necessities—free in increasing quantities. Few people know that last year, for instance, about 100,000 Afghans applied to our military hospitals for treatment. We gave tens of thousands of exercise books to Afghan schools...."

In addition to the commander's story, I shall cite some facts communicated to me by G. Chistyakov, a political instructor with a Soviet army unit. In the past three months alone, he said, the men of his unit have helped build a new school in the town of Shindand, repaired two schools in nearby districts, built or repaired roads in the same backwoods area, helped Afghan workers build a new village for the home-coming refugees, cleaned a lot of irrigation ditches, and restored a village diesel electric station....

"As a military man," the LSTC commander concluded, "I am convinced that on the basis of the Geneva agreements on stopping interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, the Afghan people must deal with their problems on their own as they advance towards national peace and build up an independent, non-aligned and neutral state...."

Afghanistan has entered a crucial period since Geneva.

VADIM OKULOV

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Maurice Strong's plan

How are we to make international relations, the behavior of governments and states, conform with the realities of the nuclear age? How are we to set about building a mechanism that will help us discuss the common problems of our interrelated and interdependent world responsibly, at a government level, and how are we to begin searching together for ways of balancing the contradictory interests of nations?

Recently I talked with a man who seems to know the answers to these questions. His name is Maurice Strong. Though close on sixty, he let me into the details of his plan with youthful vigour. But before revealing the plan, I shall acquaint readers with its architect.

Maurice Strong comes from the Canadian province of Manitoba. A holder of honorary degrees from Canadian, U.S. and British universities, he is a truly versatile personality. As chairman of the American Water Development Inc., he enjoys a reputation as a big businessman, and the recent election of Maurice Strong as president of the World Federation of U.N. Associations has added to his reputation as a thoughtful and highly experienced politician.

The political career of Maurice Strong is inseparably linked with the United Nations. For almost forty years he has repeatedly headed its various bodies, and has held the post of Assistant Secretary-General. This experience has now been transformed into an initiative which is gradually being put into practice. The idea is to help give the United Nations a new lease of life and make it an effective instrument in saving the world community in the face of the military, economic and ecological threat.

Strong asserts that arms and war can no longer be instruments of policy. The awareness that peace is necessary for all calls for mutual security. The United States cannot feel secure if the Soviet Union is not secure. The security of each state is impossible without equal security for all.

At the same time, the world will not feel calm and confident unless it solves the problems facing the developing nations and copes with the ecological drama threatening our civilization. All these phenomena are interconnected and have a global character. No state, even the most powerful one, can effectively tackle them single-handed. Only multilateral, collective efforts can bring effective results. Countries will be able to survive by acting together, not against each other. Such is the imperative of the nuclear age.



Maurice Strong knows the answer

Maurice Strong told me that collective and constructive understanding between all nations was the key issue of present-day political development, the pivot of a global security system. He found a further proof of the truth of these words in Mikhail Gorbachev's article "Reality and Guarantees for a Secure World," which he read in the newspaper Pravda last autumn.

The article confirmed his idea that a global security system would function most effectively on the basis of the U.N. Charter and within the U.N. framework. The United Nations itself needs to change if it is to fulfil such a role, Maurice Strong believes. It should win greater confidence, respect and support on the part of the world community and help create a situation wherein all states would be prepared to cooperate with the United Nations in a real way, and respect and implement its decisions. In other words, the United Nations needs new, realistic and bold ideas, creative initiatives.

Such ideas, Mr Strong believes, could be jointly generated by outstanding representatives of different countries with vast experience in politics, economics, public relations, science and military and other fields. He proposes that a commission on global security and multilateral cooperation be set up under the aegis of the World Federation of United Nations Associations. The commision, to be made up of reputable public figures, will within three years have to work out and submit to the United Nations specific measures aimed at enhancing its role and prestige in organizing a comprehensive security system.

Maurice Strong's colleagues in the World Federation of United Nations Associations welcomed their president's initiative as a fruitful and constructive idea. It was also welcomed in Moscow, where Mr Strong discussed his plan with Soviet statesmen and political and public figures.

Andrei Gromyko assured Mr Strong that he would constantly have the support of the Soviet Union in his venture.

Time will show how quickly Mr Strong's initiative can be realized. But the very fact that it has been advanced is gratifying and, in my view, highly significant. A product of new political thinking, it indicates important changes in public consciousness that go beyond national bounds and class affiliation. Genuine, rather than speculative, immediate rather than distant world wide interest in the survival of civilization is producing components for a future security system. Maurice Strong's plan is undoubtedly one such component. The sphere of reasonable responsibility and the rational organization of world affairs badly need devotion to the common cause.

SERGEI GOLYAKO

The door open to control

The more sophisticated armaments become and the more such armaments are manufactured, the more difficult it is to verify how agreements on the reduction or elimination of armaments are observed. That is an axiom of disarmament. Equally true is the statement that control is an essential condition for disarmament.

An international meeting of experts on verification problems was recently held at the Dagomys tourist complex in Sochi as part of the U.N. world disarmament campaign. Sponsored by the U.N. secretariat jointly with the Soviet Peace Committee, it brought together 40 leading experts from 22 countries. Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Yasushi Akashi presided over the meeting.

The meeting took place on the eve of the Soviet-American summit in Moscow and the third U.N. General Assembly special session on disarmament, and at the height of preparations to ratify the INF treaty in the upper legislative bodies of the two great powers.

A small sensation

In general, questions of control are regarded by journalists as boring and incomprehensible, and the participants in the Sochi meeting seemed to have no intention of disproving this: the discussion was conducted behind closed doors, and the comments made by experts in the lobby were brief and professional.

But the press conference held on the first day of the meeting compelled journalists to take a new look at the question of arms control. The Soviet and American ambassadors declared that, in spite of minor differences, their reports at the plenary sitting contained similar conceptual provisions. They had in mind the interconnection between verification and security.

Both speakers – special envoy Oleg Grinevsky and Assistant to the Secretary of Defence (atomic energy) Robert Barker – found no differences of principle in their approaches to the arms control issue. A small sensation, but a sensation nevertheless. It showed how far the two countries had advanced towards each other in understanding the criteria of a stable peace equally secure for all nations.

"Serious arms control must reduce tension, enhance stablity and increase security," Robert Barker said. "These benefits must accrue to the signatories of the arms control agreements, and it is even better if non-signatories can also reap these benefits. Verification is a sine qua non of any serious arms control agreement."

Relying on his experience of talks on nuclear tests over many years, ambassador Barker stressed the importance of further bilateral and multilateral efforts in defining the technical parameters of control. He recalled the favourite saying of President Reagan, which he repeated at his meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev in English and even in Russian: "Trust, but verify."

In Barker's opinion, there are no universal systems of control and verification. Appropriate methods of control should be carefully selected for each new treaty.

Similar ideas were expressed by Oleg Grinevsky, who set out the main principles of the Soviet position on the questions of control. "We need a single, integral system of control that would become the basis of trust," he said. "The new political thinking has introduced to international reality the category of comprehensive control as the most reliable guarantee of security, the unity of words and deeds, the strengthening of the moral foundations of policy. Control is the principal support for a nuclear-free world, for a comprehensive international security system and, lastly, for a substantial reduction in armaments."

I noticed that the attitude of different Soviet departments to control had changed appreciably recently. In the past, the Soviet approach was dominated by fears that the other side would peep through the keyhole to find out all our secrets. Emphasis was laid on national control facilities, and on-site inspections of every kind aroused special alarm. Not a few fears had to be overcome and a number of stereotypes broken in order to get the matter off the ground.

Reliable, indisputable and scrupulous methods for the destruction of weapons, and commitments with regard to the remaining armaments and permitted military activity, are seen by the Soviet Union as the main conditions for effective verification, which is to play an exceptional role in the formation of a comprehensive system of international security. When we hear talk of the need for double control, our reply is that we advocate triple control using national technical facilities and international procedures, including compulsory on-site inspections.

Glasnost, openness and trust

The most recent example is the drafting of the INF treaty. The regime of control proposed by the Soviet Union was in many respects far more comprehensive than the one offered by the United States. This evidently explains why the American delegation did not fully agree with the Soviet draft. However, solutions taking into account the interests of both sides were ultimately found.

In the first half of this year, Oleg Grinevsky said, the Soviet Union and the United States are expected to conclude a treaty on a 50-per cent reduction in strategic offensive weapons and an agreement on strict observance of the ABM treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

Some of the moot questions relating to these accords have already been

thrashed out in Geneva and others are open to compromises. As a result, our notions of the tasks, role, principles, forms and methods of verification which seemed mere speculation only yesterday, are expanding. Take, for instance, the opening to inspection of military bases stationed on the territory of other countries, a measure necessary to ensure absolute confidence that the disarmament agreements are strictly observed.

Talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, are also likely to begin this year. Their mandate, including the provision on control, has largely been coordinated. The NATO and Warsaw Treaty states have agreed that it will be an effective and strict regime, including compulsory on-site inspection and an exchange of detailed information. The Soviet Union considers it useful to exchange data on the armed forces and conventional armaments of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty states in Europe in the near future.

The following idea, important to my mind, was voiced at the Dagomys meeting: the Geneva conference can already start coordinating the main elements of an international mechanism for control over observance of the treaty on the complete banning of nuclear tests, including on-site inspection and an international system of seismic and radiation control.

The Soviet delegation backed the Swedish proposal for establishing "a disarmament conference control station," with shares to be contributed by all states wishing to use it.

Experts pointed to the need for strict control to prevent the non-deployment of weapons in outer space. It may be recalled that the Soviet Union put before the disarmament conference thorough proposals for setting up an international space inspectorate to see that the objects deployed by member states in outer space are not weapons or equipped with such weapons.

In the opinion of Soviet experts, the Canada-sponsored concept Packset envisaging the use of satellites for control over the deployment of weapons in space may become a supplement to the Soviet proposal for setting up an international space inspectorate.

Ambassador Victor Israelyan, professor at the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, spoke on pressing issues of present-day international relations bearing on control. In his report "Glasnost, Openness and Confidence-Building", the ambassador said that confidence could only be based on verifiable knowledge.

Together with its Warsaw Treaty allies, the Soviet Union has advanced far-reaching initiatives for holding consultations with NATO with the aim of comparing the military doctrines of the two blocs. This will help remove the mutual suspicion and mistrust accumulated over the years, and gain better mutual understanding.

Greater openness in military spending, Israelyan said, would strengthen confidence. Previous attempts to cut military budgets had produced no results because it was hard to compare them. Indeed, it is not easy to compare defence expenditures in view of fundamental distinctions between the structures of the military budgets and price formation mechanisms of different countries.



Drawing by Alexander Arkhutik

A realistic comparison of total military expenditures can be made after the Soviet Union has carried out its planned sweeping reform of price formation. In the next two or three years, a Soviet expert said, we shall be able to compare the figures of interest to us and our partners, because they will symmetrically reflect the expenditures of the countries involved.

Special attention was paid by experts to control over halting the manufacture of chemical weapons and destroying their stockpiles. This is understandable because an appropriate international convention is being drawn up. Meanwhile, chemical weapons – the "poor men's atomic bomb," as they were described by journalists – are being used by both sides in the fratricidal Iran-Iraq war. While taking part in the drafting of a convention, the United States has started the production of binary weapons.

The participants in the meeting discussed how to control the destruction not only of stockpiles of chemical weapons but also of facilities for manufacturing them. A number of countries are trying to place some of their chemical plants beyond control on the pretext that they are private property.

The difficulty of verification in such cases was underlined in particular by Col. Wilhelm Germann, a West German expert, Japanese ambassador Chusei Yamada, and Lynn Hansen, assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The question of allowing inspectors to visit privately-owned chemical plants is one of the last obstacles in the way of concluding a convention on chemical weapons.

No final document was adopted at the Dagomys meeting. But some results can nevertheless be summed up. The meeting showed that, for the first time in the history of international talks, arms control had ceased to be a political problem and was increasingly becoming a matter for discussion by experts, a sphere of cooperation, not confrontation. It laid the foundations for future approaches based on trust and a conscious, at times self-restricting, attitude to control.

These approaches testify to the growing alliance between policy and science. Today diplomacy relies on scientific knowledge, on the whole range of means provided by technological progress. A new component – world public opinion – can now be added to this alliance. The talks on disarmament and verification are being conducted under the control of public opinion. In this lies the guarantee of their success.

ALEXEI BUKALOV
our special correspondent

Sochi-Moscow

The primaries have already produced their favourites, among them Vice-President George Bush (Rep.); his main rival, Senate minority leader Robert Dole, has stepped down after his poor showing in Connecticut. Among the Democrats so far two candidates have assured themselves of roughly equal support: the governor of Massachusetts Michael Dukakis and the black public figure Jesse Jackson. Following below is a profile on Michael Dukakis.

The Candidate from Boston

VICTOR YEVGENYEV

Americans elect their president in a leap year. Superstition is not an American habit, at least that is what the authors of the best seller recently published in America, "Habits of the Heart," claim. Nevertheless, for many Democratic hopefuls, the election run-up in 1988 has proved unlucky. But not for Michael Dukakis. The results of the primaries that have already been held in most of the biggest states have brought him closer to his goal.

Happy campaigners: Dukakis and his wife.

Ups and Downs

The life and career of Dukakis is associated with Massachusetts and its capital Boston, where Mike's parents, Greek immigrants, settled in 1912. Boston is the scientific and cultural centre of the United States and is often referred to as the "American Athens" because it is one of the strongholds of American democracy and because a comparatively large number of people of Greek origin live there.

The 12th biggest state in terms of population has always been a bastion of the Democratic Party. The Democrats are led by such personalities of national importance as Senator Edward Kennedy, former Speaker of the House of Representatives Thomas P. O'Neil and former Senator Paul Tsongas. Dukakis has the support of the same forces of the American Establishment that produced John Kennedy in the past. His election fund is bigger than that of any of his Democratic rivals — 13.5 million dollars.

Massachusetts is known for its liberal traditions. It was in that state at the beginning of the eighties that the movement for a moratorium on nuclear armaments originated. And it was the legislators from Massachusetts who pushed the idea of a debate on a moratorium in U.S. Congress. In my opinion, the defection of a number of right-wing thriving Democrats in Washington to the "President's party," and the mounting influence of businessmen representing the high-technology companies and enterprises with a military orientation concentrated in the state have produced a shift to the right in public opinion there. Nevertheless, liberal and centrist sentiments predominate in Massachusetts. To a certain extent this is also the outcome of mass immigration into the area during this century from Italy, Poland, Spain, Greece, Russia and the Latin American countries.

Having taken a degree in political sciences and a doctorate in law, M. Dukakis moved step by step up the political ladder. He was elected to the Massachusetts legislature and appeared as an arbiter in "The Advocates" on Boston TV.

At the 1974 elections, Dukakis was elected governor of his home state with Thomas P. O'Neil, the son of the former House Majority leader, as Vice-Governor. Dukakis took vigorous steps toward reducing the immense budget deficit. But he found that he himself had greatly curtailed his freedom of action by having promised not to increase taxes during the election campaign. He worked for months on a radical solution to the economic problems, but was finally compelled to risk increasing taxes and cutting back social spending. He paid dearly for this — four years later his political career suffered a serious setback.

Dukakis learnt a lot from that first

failure, and in 1982 he was back in the Governor's Mansion.

The Massachusetts miracle

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and its research laboratories played an important part in promoting his plans. The key element in the "Dukakis system" was the concerted efforts of labour unions, government, business circles and scientists in resolving development problems of the state. Dukakis, dubbed by newsmen an "intellectual technocrat," put forward a programme of centres, specifying areas of science-intensive high technology, such as microelectronics, and providing subsidies for research projects.

The Governor gave top priority to a programme of employment and professional training. Its purpose was to compensate for social welfare. Unemployment in the state fell from 8 to 4 per cent, and personal incomes were 20 per cent higher than the national average. Massachusetts moved up from 14th to 4th place among the states in per capita income and is now second only to Alaska, Connecticut and Maryland, for that matter. Massachusetts has the best medicare system in the country. It has 400,000 students, which makes their share of the population 1.5 times higher than the average in the U.S.A. Yet even so the science-intensive high-technology companies are feeling an acute shortage of personnel.

It is hard to judge to what extent the Massachusetts economy owes its success to Dukakis' economic policy. Some Republicans seek to attribute it to Reaganomics. But this, in my view, is not borne out by the results of the 1986 elections, when 70 per cent of the electorate voted for a Democratic governor. The number of registered Democrats in the state is three times higher than the number of registered Republicans.

Dukakis has stressed his negative attitude towards increasing the country's budget deficit. He has repeatedly warned that a country cannot function as a nation if it borrows billions upon billions of dollars.

Dukakis has devoted much attention to racial problems in the state; he strongly urged that "any stigma or disgrace should be forever removed" from the names of Sacco and Vanzetti. His election junket of the country attracted attention for one detail unusual for the United States: he addressed voters in several languages, depending on his audience. In Texas, for instance, where 20 per cent of the population are Hispanics, he spoke Spanish.

What are the Governor's priorities in foreign policy?

His choice of vote-catching election subjects does not go beyond the framework of traditional Democratic views. I would even say that in general, when it comes to talking about the main components of a future foreign policy, he is saying very little. Perhaps his attitude is most traditional when it concerns the Middle East. There he favours first and foremost the strengthening of American-Israeli strategic cooperation.

The Governor supports the Soviet-American INF treaty. He has also made his own contribution to improving relations between the two countries by arranging direct trading links with Soviet Baltic ports.

Since Dukakis is of Greek origin, the comments of the Athens press are of particular interest. So far they note that Dukakis has not made his views known on Greece's relations with Turkey or the Cyprus problem.

A weighty factor

Dukakis' success in the race for the White House owes a lot to his reputation as "a tested leader," the only incumbent Governor among the presidential hopefuls. He has also made a good showing in public debates. As Time magazine noted, when attacked publicly Dukakis becomes a formidable opponent.

Even those Massachusetts politicians who do not favour Dukakis recognize in him a leader with strong moral principles. Americans like his sense of personal dignity, which is combined with respect for and attention to those around him, his quickness, polite but devastating, in public debates with his rivals. A conservative by nature, Mike, as he is referred to at the Governor's headquarters, is very sociable and can easily be reached. His staff note that he never offers advice on issues he is unfamiliar with.

The Governor's wife, Kitty, is, according to people who know her, the only person he talks to about everything. Her office is on the Governor's official premises.

And what do the public opinion polls say?

Polls conducted by Time magazine give Dukakis the edge over the other Democratic contenders for a number of reasons: he has the experience required by a president, he could effectively build relations with the Soviet Union, and he is prepared to face any international crisis that might arise. And he trails only slightly behind Jesse Jackson on such a factor as strong and decisive leadership.

But for Michael Dukakis the hardest trials lie ahead. He not only has to win sufficient backing to ensure his party's nomination, but also to outstrip the Republican leader, Vice-President George Bush.

Photo from Time magazine (U.S.A.)

■

The sails of trade are billowing in the fair political wind. Such, briefly, is the outcome of the 11th U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC), held in Moscow on April 12-14.

This question might cause a sober-minded commercialist to raise an eyebrow. What kind of "breakthrough" can one possibly hope for in a situation where Soviet-American commodity turnover continues to dwindle: it is now less than half even of the 1985 figure which came to 2.7 billion rubles as against 1.2 billion in 1987 (incidentally it was in 1985 that ASTEC had its tenth meeting)? The structure of Soviet-American trade remains lopsided—in 1988 the U.S.S.R. supplied the U.S. with 326 million, but imported 2.4 billion rubles' worth of goods; in 1987, the figures were 279 and 919 million respectively. The share of the United States, the leading commercial power, in our trade comes to one per cent, while America does only 0.5 per cent of its trade with the Soviet Union. What kind of "breakthrough" can we hope for in the treatment accorded by the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. is effectively prohibitive (the customs duties levied on Soviet exports are five to ten times higher than usual, a large number of Soviet products are banned from the United States altogether, and the import of many more is severely restricted). Moreover, the export of 100,000 American product and technology items to the U.S.S.R. is under federal control.

But why, then, did a 500-strong delegation of American businessmen—the largest ever since the establishment of ASTEC fifteen years ago—land in Moscow this April? What lay behind their unfeigned interest in making contacts with Soviet foreign trade organizations?

The improvement in the political climate in Soviet-American relations following the conclusion of the INF treaty, and a realistic prospect of an agreement on a 50 per cent cut in offensive strategic arms furnish only part of the answer. The other part is the Soviet perestroika, born of new thinking, the resolute measures being taken to transform the Soviet economy and foreign trade. We interviewed a number of American businessmen in the halls of the Moscow international trade centre —the venue of the ASTEC meeting— and the word "perestroika" always evoked a flood of questions invariably beginning with "Any changes in...?"

Is a breakthrough possible?

William Verity and Vladimir Kamentsev: trade partners.

Exhaustive answers cannot yet be given to all of these questions, all the more so since, as regards Soviet-American trade, the answers do not depend on Moscow alone. The most important thing is, Soviet and American businessmen agree, that the ice of military and political tension has been broken; this promises an appreciable increase in the two-way flow of commodities.

"Given the normalization of the current situation and a reliable political, contractual and legal basis for the development of trade and economic links, we shall find plenty to buy from, and to sell to, you," said Vladimir Kamentsev, Chairman of the Foreign Economic Relations Commission of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. "I want to tell everyone here—Soviets as well as Americans—that the United States government has come to Moscow with a positive attitude to move our economic relationship forward—and in so doing to seek to contribute toward a further improvement in the overall relationship between our two countries." (William Verity, U.S. Secretary of Commerce.)

This is exactly what American business quarters—320 ASTEC member-companies, in particular—expect. They are willing to establish strong business links with Soviet partners, a prospect which appears more alluring to them than ever thanks to the development of new forms of cooperation.

Much has been said at the ASTEC and its working groups' plenary meetings about the promise held out by the establishment of joint enterprises on the territory of the U.S.S.R. (there are two of them so far, with 14 more under consideration). Seven major U.S. corporations have set up the American trade consortium recently with a view to promoting new forms of cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

An important tangible result of the 11th ASTEC meeting was that it approved the "basic principles and trends" in developing Soviet-American trade and economic links which could provide the international legal instruments capable of protecting the interests of American firms and Soviet organizations, with the new conditions of business cooperation taken into account. The results of the tenth session of the Joint U.S.S.R.-U.S. Commercial Commission, held simultaneously with the ASTEC meeting, can also be described as positive. Jack Matlock, the U.S. Ambassador in the U.S.S.R., told us that at the session constructive steps had been taken by both sides, and that he expected a fruitful discussion of political and economic factors bearing on the progress of trade and economic relations.

Nevertheless, it is still uncertain whether all these good intentions and the measures already taken bring about a breakthrough in business cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. In a New Times interview, his third over the past decade, James Giffen, the current ASTEC President, said that the volume of Soviet-American trade could well grow to ten billion dollars (six billion rubles). The two sides could attain this level of trade given two factors: "the first is an improvement in political relations. If President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have a successful meeting in June I have no doubt that there is going to be an expansion in trade. This meeting will also create an assurance that we can remove the existing barriers to trade and create a new mechanism to facilitate business contacts. ASTEC is now working on a model of such mechanism.

"The second factor: we must learn how to market our products. If they want to move to Western markets today, Soviet exporters have to learn the Western marketing methods, practices, procedures. Just in the same way as Western businessmen coming to the Soviet Union have to understand Soviet practices and methods.

"As to your question about a possibility of a breakthrough in mutual trade, I think there is a breakthrough. There is more interest among American businessmen in the Soviet market. The main reason for this interest is your perestroika..."

Business America's new interest in Soviet market is most welcome. It could become a prerequisite for mutual confidence building, and the resultant trade deals, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation and joint ventures. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Soviet-American understanding in economic matters is still way below the level required by the complex international situation and by the need for new approaches to world affairs.

Mikhail Gorbachev noted this when addressing the ASTEC participants in the Kremlin. "Isn't it time to begin the reconversion of both the economy and political thinking—its demilitarization, I would say? New thinking has to be extended to the sphere of economic relations at last," he said. "From this viewpoint, our perestroika is an invitation to work out a new system of values in economic relations between our two countries with all their social and ideological differences."

Viewed from this angle, the results of the 11th ASTEC meeting admittedly look none too impressive. Although the sails of trade are billowing with political wind, the economic ships of the world's two leading countries haven't yet started drawing closer together...

EVGENY ANDRIANOV,
FELIX GORYUNOV
our special correspondents

Photo from ASTEC magazine

He who wanted

LEONID IONIN

In one of his stories Fazil Iskander describes how the stormy history of our country was seen by the people of the village of Chegem in Abkhazia, politically innocent, but well-versed in mountain life. It is impossible to retell his story, it has to be read (it was published in the 2nd issue of the magazine Yunost this year). But I would like to quote the names he gave to the two main characters. The mountain villager called Lenin "He-Who-Wanted-To-Do-Good-But-Didn't-Live-To-Do-It." He was succeeded by "Big Moustache," who was to blame for the tragedies that reverberated in the most distant corners of the mountains.

"He-Who-Wanted-To-Do-Good-But-Didn't-Live-To-Do-It." A highly expressive definition, thanks to its simplicity and perhaps even naivety. And, most important of all, a definition that looks not back into the past, but ahead to the decades that were to come.

A person's character and politics

To begin with, I should like to reject the sentimental image of Lenin as a benign grandfather, a kind old man who looked after and protected village children and members of government alike. Such propaganda clichés do more harm than good, no matter to whom they are applied. Concern for the fate of your close associates and staff is not the trait that sums up a politician's style. One might recall that Stalin too looked touched by the directness of the Buryat child in that widely publicized photograph, that he too was concerned with moving the Rykov family into a bigger flat, so that the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars could cope better with his difficult job. It's another matter that the father of the child was arrested and perished, or that Rykov was almost immediately "moved" from his new and comfortable flat into a prison cell, and that his life ended tragically.

Real politics, Lenin said, begin when they concern the fate of millions of people. Obviously it is not public expressions of humanitarianism that determine the style of a politician, but the content and direction of the radical changes he effects in the way of life and destiny of tens of millions. Such a radical change is impossible without many victims, without resorting to harsh and, at times, even cruel measures.

"Has any thought been given to the ways and means of bringing to book members of trust boards for incorrect accounting and for operating business at a loss? I wonder if our People's Commissariat for Justice is asleep? This calls for a number of model trials with the application of the fiercest chastisement. It looks as though the P.C.J. has failed to realize that the New Economic Policy demands new modes of the greater infliction of fiercer penalties." That is a quotation from Lenin's letter of February 11, 1922, to G.Y. Sokolnikov.

The words prison and execution figured fairly frequently in his lexicon during that critical period when the question of whether or not there would be socialism in Russia hung in the balance.

I repeat: one should not be deluded and create the figure of a Father Christmas with a sack of presents for the children of workers and peasants. Lenin shouldered the heavy burden of power. And awareness of his responsibility compelled him to be firm and implacable.

This ability to wield power, recognized by enemies and supporters alike, is sometimes given to a person at birth. But what is important too are the ideas that give the right to power. Lenin was sublimely self-confident and convinced of the correctness of his views on social development. Moreover, he was possessed of highly acute political intuition. One could almost call it a sixth sense that enabled him to feel changes in the situation and the mood of the people. This sense at times proved more important than adherence to theoretically developed truths or sentimental loyalty to principles. In today's language this is known as realism in politics. And realism is more important than any dogmas.

That was what made him a creative politician, always able to reconsider his views in favour of the realities, to acknowledge a mistake in theory if it did not conform to the realities of experienc

Just one example: the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country. Suffice it to say that the entire logic of Marxism spoke of the impossibility of a victory for socialism in Russia without the victory of a world revolution. Not for nothing was this revolution so eagerly expected in the first postrevolutionary years. Even the courts sentenced members of the bourgeoisie to indefinite prison terms, noting only "until the victory of the world revolution." It was expected imminently so they weren't given much time to say good-bye to their families: "What for? You'll see them again soon."

Lenin found the strength in himself to abandon the slogan of world revolution, a lofty and romantic slogan, but fraught with the danger of downfall for Soviet power. Far from all his associates, although well-versed in Marxist theory and loyal Bolsheviks – understood the need for and inevitability of such an about-turn. Many were caught off-balance by this change. That was always the case – before the revolution in the course of the struggle for the party's influence over the masses, during the preparations for an armed uprising, and after the revolution – in the discussions on the Brest peace, in the arguments on the New Economic Policy, on thousands of other less significant issues. That is why there was no one around Lenin who at one time or another did not "make mistakes."

He himself also made mistakes, but he was able to recognize them as such and put things right. Victory was the proof of his rightness. Others lacked this ability. That is why, among all his associates, there was none who was Lenin's equal. They were gifted, able, industrious – like thousands upon thousands of others. Lenin was a political genius.

He himself was aware of that, and could therefore forgive the mistakes of others.

He prized and appreciated people. Each to the extent he deserved. But sentimental pity was alien to him.

Tens and hundreds of millions plus or minus millions of lives and destinies – that is political arithmetic. It is a harsh arithmetic.

Hegel wrote of the World Spirit that manifested itself in the course of history: "The World Spirit ignores the fact that it uses numerous generations for the job of perceiving itself, it ignores the monstrous expenditure of emerging and perishing human forces; it can afford such an ex-

to do good

Drawing by Natan Altman

penditure, it is playing en grand..."

That quotation can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, as a statement of fact that at the turning points of history bloodshed and victims are the harsh but inevitable price of progress. It is impossible to be reconciled to that, but almost never has it been possible to avoid such a state of affairs. Thus, the harshness of the measures Lenin insisted on was a forced harshness, stemming from the scale of the historical task.

The quotation can also be interpreted as a profound philosophical version of the saying "you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs," in other words the World Spirit gives you the right to commit any crime against humanity as an ante festum justification of any "monstrous expenditure... of human forces," as long as this expenditure is in a good cause.

At this point the question "What is the cause?" arises.

What didn't he live to do?

That is not a simple question. On the basis of Lenin's own writings and research carried out by historians, one can state confidently today that in the last years of his life he wanted to see the New Economic Policy (NEP) succeed, he wanted the emergency measures introduced after the revolution and because of the war lifted (specifically, to have the powers of the Extraordinary Commission curtailed) and the speedy restoration of normal state and civilian life in Russia.

In Lenin's plans was NEP supposed to last a long time? That question cannot be answered emphatically either way. His remarks that NEP was to provide a breathing space, that it was a temporary retreat, a tactical manoeuvre to rebuild forces, are well known. Incidentally, Stalin used these remarks at the end of the 1920s when he began his own "bureaucratic revolution." But one should also pause to reflect whether these remarks about NEP as a temporary measure were just a tactical move, essential to overcome the resistance of his dogmatic colleagues? Because how many of them "fell away" at this turning point in the life of the nation!

At any rate, Lenin set no deadline for NEP. It was a long-term fundamental programme.

We know that Lenin greatly desired the electrification of Russia, that he formulated the remarkable cooperative plan using the ideas of gifted young economists like Chayanov and Kondratyev. Democratization of power, electrification (i.e., building the foundation for future industrial development), coopera-

tion and NEP – those were the foundation stones laid by Lenin for the Soviet state.

But what kind of building was supposed to be erected on that foundation? That is probably the most important question. Actually, it is the same question as what Lenin "didn't live to do."

It is senseless to guess what would have happened in 1927, 1928, 1929 and subsequent years if Lenin had remained at the helm of government. History can be interpreted in a number of ways. For instance, history can be regarded as offering many variants and always being open-ended. At any moment it can develop along different lines. In other words, on one and the same foundation one can build a palace of culture or a torture chamber, a pub or a church.

Translated into the terms of our history, it could be said that the foundation for a socialist state laid by Lenin was misused – it was used to build an administrative system.

But from such an interpretation it is hard to learn lessons for the future. For it means that history merely took a different turn. Lenin died and other people diverted its development along a different course.

But one can also consider that the foundation and the building are organically linked. It was claimed that there was a direct connection. That was what was meant by the once popular slogan "Stalin is the Lenin of today" – an almost blasphemous comparison. Stalin not only fooled the party and the people when he carefully dissected Lenin's texts in discussions with the opposition – both right-wing and left-wing. His dogmatic seminarian's logic, his coarseness, which Lenin had noted, the despotism which Lenin had not had the time to note (perhaps because then it had not been given full play), his paranoid tendencies, which began very shortly to be displayed – all that played its part in the establishment of Stalinism as a political doctrine. One could name many other factors, not personal, but social, to which he owed his victory, but one cannot fail to admit that Stalin built a sort of socialism on Lenin's foundation. Only it was a bureaucratic dogmatic socialism. Stalin's brand of socialism differed from Lenin's as a diseased cell differs from a healthy one.

Stalin developed one-sidedly and adapted for his own way of thought and his own aims many Leninist ideas. He acknowledged strict centralism, but dropped the word "democratic," he picked up the idea of uniting peasant holdings, but rejected the principle that it should be voluntary, he adopted the thesis of the need for ideological unity, but rejected the idea of a creative quest, he adopted the idea of a dictatorship, but forgot about the proletariat. He did not forget it entirely – he remembered the word – but he used the term dictatorship of the proletariat to cover up his own unilateral bureaucratic dictatorship.

Nor was the bureaucracy born under Stalin. In the last years of his life, Lenin fought desperately against the apparatus that had already developed since the revolution. It is sufficient to take a look at the last volumes of his works and letters to see how desperate was this struggle.

I have reached the fairly unexpected conclusion that we still have to discover Lenin and draw the main lessons from his life. There hasn't been a single leader of our country who did not swear by Lenin. No matter what path or policy he followed, it was always claimed that he was following Lenin's path. A short while ago, one of Uzbekistan's party leaders committed suicide. When he was secretary of the regional party committee he was known in his region as "the Kashka-Darya Lenin."

It is clear now, however, that no more profiteering on Lenin's name is possible. The image of Lenin must now be rediscovered. Reopened in all its complexity and diversity.

Lenin's greatness does not need constant confirmation. His deeds will never be erased from the minds of men. But what we need so badly today is to see him as he really was. We need that to understand our own sources more clearly.

That does not mean taking up where Lenin left off. Despite the fatalistic aphorism that history does not repeat itself. Neither Lenin nor his junior contemporaries, such as Bukharin, Rykov and others, can offer us firm advice on how to proceed further, or point the road to the future. Too much time has elapsed, the world and our country have changed too greatly.

So what we are looking for in Lenin's writings are not universal recipes for anything that life might spring on us, nor is it our task to copy the political, economic and other structures he created. What is needed is the method, the nondogmatic Leninist method of political analysis and political action. And for that we need to know the real Lenin, not the Lenin described in the "short" and other versions of the history of the party. And that, strange as it may seem, blends perfectly with quotations from Lenin calling for criticism and recognition of one's own mistakes, although to believe the versions of the history of the party, there were no mistakes and could be none. But we don't learn the most important thing from these versions of history: we don't learn Lenin's way of thought, how he groped, made mistakes, despaired and bounced back, how he changed and remained unchanged.

We are entering a new stage in our history, there is no getting away from it, but we are learning to draw lessons from it. How precisely we carry out Lenin's behests is a measure of our loyalty to the cause he started. And the extent to which we are able to draw lessons from history is the measure of our own freedom.

Obsessed with one idea, Lenin lived by pulse of history, the life of millions of people. To them his passions were addressed. He was prompted by their ideas and aspirations, and they were prompted by his ideas and presentiments. Politics demands everything of a man, leaving little time for personal, what are known as individual human feelings.

But he achieved what has rarely fallen to the lot of one man: the affection and admiration of millions, the realization of his majestic ideas. In his lifetime Lenin knew that the fates of peoples, perhaps for centuries ahead, would be determined by his work. He wanted to do good, and he succeeded in achieving a great deal. The end of his life was the time of his triumph. What happened afterwards was beyond his powers.

It has on many occasions been noted that the most wonderful and humane ideas are often when implemented, transformed into their opposite.

In a short essay on Lenin (New Times, No. 5, 1988) I quoted some lines from Boris Pasternak's poem describing Lenin's speech at the 9th Congress of Soviets. But I omitted the last four lines of this poetic portrait:

I thought of the origin
Of years linking hardships:
Genius is the forerunner of benefits,
Oppression is revenge for its departure.

That is not a pessimistic summing up, but a wise observation on the way history operates. The poet understood that perfectly. He knew, and we know, that a man's fate is not to await passively either benefits or oppression. Each individual separately and mankind as a whole is capable of creating for himself and liberating himself. That is the main lesson to be drawn from the life of Lenin, who provided an example for centuries to come of how man can change historic circumstances in the name of his own liberation. Alone, for himself, a person can achieve this within his lifetime. He rarely succeeds in doing more. But history is made up of a series of such achievements, even though they may be interrupted by periods of regression and failure, the history which in the final count is made in the name of the liberation of Man.

The present turning point in the life of the people and the party returns us to the genuine aims of history, which Lenin so ardently desired to implement.

WHO HAS THE FINAL SAY?

On the difference between worker participation and self-management

Professor Evgeny Torkanovsky

Even when administrative methods held sway in industry, there was no shortage of appeals and slogans in favour of worker participation in management.

There was no shortage of artificially imposed public bodies supposed to ensure this participation. There are still over 80 such bodies and on each of them enterprises have to submit countless reports to various governing bodies. Why, then, are we proclaiming self-management and creating new bodies designed to be its vehicles? It would seem more reasonable to try to breathe new life into the existing system of public organizations as an answer to the problem of making production management more democratic. The question then is, what is the difference between yesterday's participation in management and self-government?

From deliberative to casting vote

Participation in management can take different forms. One can offer advice, draw up projects, criticize management, i.e., perform advisory functions.

Until recently this was the form in which workers participated in management through the above-mentioned public bodies, if they participated at all. This form of participation is not without its merits. Among other things, it ensures feedback between the subject and object of management. Its chief drawback is that management may or may not take the opinion of the work force into account. In practice this means that suggestions made by workers can be ignored, and sometimes total obedience can be imposed ("do as you are told"). The right to make decisions and the responsibility for them belongs entirely to the manager and not to the work collective.

The other form of participation in management is known as decisive. In this form the work collective does not merely offer advice, but makes binding decisions. The subject and object of management merge. In the new conditions of economic reform members of the work collective do not simply help the manager to implement decisions, but themselves set the goals, and determine the means, priorities and responsibilities of people and production units in carrying out the programme.

Only in such a set-up can we speak of the work collective being the true master of production responsible for its final results. Only in these conditions can we stimulate workers' activity.

According to the new Law on the State Enterprise (Association) the new bodies of production self-government are the General Meeting and the Council of the Work Collective (CWC). While the terms of reference of the General Meeting and the exercise of its prerogatives are straight-forward, the practicability, functions, procedure for forming the Council and its relations with other public bodies are still unclear. This causes anxiety in some people that the Council may become another of the committees, commissions and headquarters whose name is legion.

The CWC differs from the existing advisory bodies in that it takes final decisions. They are binding on all the members of the collective, including the manager. This is so unusual, so unlike the traditional system of management, that attempts are being made to get round this provision in practice and in the press. While there is a lot of lip service to the supreme power of the work collective and its responsibility, cries of "anarchy" are raised as soon as the collective begins to exercise this power. It has to be remembered that anarchy means flouting the law and not observing it.

It is necessary to stress that the CWC is a sovereign and independent body. It is not subordinate to any other bodies. Other bodies merely establish the framework for the enterprise's activity. But within this framework the decisions of the CWC can only be cancelled by the General Meeting to which it is subordinate.

Those who are putting spokes in the wheels of perestroika are today trying to turn the CWC into a consultative body, while giving the manager the final say. Various methods are used to that end: appointments are disguised as elections; the CWC is turned into an assembly and not a working body by electing between 100 and 200 members to it (in this case the CWC presidium is elected which basically consists of members of the management with a sprinkling of workers); at the instigation of the trade union and sometimes Party bodies, the manager is elected as its chairman (or, failing that, deputy chairman), and so on. Issuing government instructions to the CWC is another way of turning it into an institution without any real power.

And yet vesting the Councils with extensive powers is not an end in itself, but a means towards effective and flexible production management. The CWC cannot stand aloof from the conflict situations that arise in the process of production (which are bound to arise, for example, in connection with the claims of factory workshops under the self-financing system). The CWC has to make decisions on moral and material incentives for the workers. It should certainly also exercise functions of control. The main business of the Council, however, is to make collective decisions on the enterprise's development, strategy, such as planning, determining expenditure, re-tooling of production, and distribution.

New role for the plant manager

What is the director's role in these conditions? It is evident that the unity of the management system calls for a single governing body. On the face of it, no good can result if management is exercised by two sides which could oppose each other on some issues.

Until now the economic manager has been seen as the "representative of the state" in the collective. He personified the interests of the state and not the collective. His responsibility was to the state.

In the new economic mechanism, the head of the enterprise is not seen as a foreign body in the collective, but as a body belonging to that collective. However, we should not go to the other ex-

At the Ryazan electronic instrument-making plant, the Director and ordinary workers discuss all problems on an equal footing.
Photo by A. Secretarev

treme and reduce the role of the economic manager to that of a rank-and-file member of the collective sharing responsibility with all the other members. Socialist self-government will, if anything, increase the role of competent and energetic leaders, notably the one at the top.

His ideas must be approved by the collective. This is not a mere formality. Approval by the Council of the Work Collective reduces the risk of mistakes and arbitrary decisions, some of which may be "prompted" from above.

The management process does not end with the making of decisions. The decisions have to be put into practice. Competent implementation of the decisions taken by the CWC is one of the main tasks of the economic manager and the specialist managerial staff. In day-to-day work, one man must be boss, orders must be fulfilled, the strictest order and discipline are necessary in which the will of the leader is a major ingredient.

There is yet another new function of the economic manager – to organize production self-government.

But what of other public organizations? The creation of the CWCs revolutionizes the whole system of public organizations and elective bodies at enterprises. The main thrust of this revolution is drastically to cut the number of weak, often overlapping and ineffectual public bodies. Today the Council of Team Leaders, the Councils of Foremen and the Councils of Shop Stewards often perform the same functions. The Scientific and Technical Society and the Society of Inventors and Rationalizers perform the same functions. These are just some of the organizations that overlap. The proliferation of all kinds of headquarters, commissions, councils, committees and bureaux still tends to be seen as a way towards more democratic management. In reality, it breeds formalistic attitudes and distracts people from real work. Even the dismantling of many public bodies (which is also a sign of the times) is done on command from above in the same way as they were formed. This means that formalistic attitudes persist.

Abandoning the practices of creating (or dismantling) public organizations on command from above is no simple matter, but this practice has to be abandoned once and for all. The work collective must have the final say. It is high time the primary Party, Young Communist League and trade union organizations were given broader rights. They should have the right to decide whether to set up various commissions, councils, and the like. Otherwise we shall never get rid of "democracy" by injunction.

We see that relations between the CWCs and the trade unions are not always smooth. Many functions of the trade unions inevitably devolve on the Councils. This has prompted talk about the diminishing role of the trade unions.

In fact, no harm will be done if some functions are taken over by the CWCs. On the contrary, the trade unions will be able to concentrate on what has always constituted the core of their activity: the social and cultural needs of the working man, labour and living conditions, leisure and recreation.

The people we choose

Transition to self-management at industrial enterprises puts new tasks before the Party organizations. Command methods are based on specific directives which must be fulfilled without reservations. In the command system, initiative was often punishable. In such a system economic managers were valued primarily for obedient and prompt fulfilment of commands.

In the present economic conditions we need a creative and not an obedient attitude. We need to promote a mass of competent managers who can take up upon themselves the tasks of leaders of perestroika at every level of the economy. This invests the words "selection of personnel" with a new meaning. From now on managerial personnel is, with few exceptions, elected and not appointed. Preparation and organization of elections to the Council of Work Collectives and managerial posts is a complex and novel task for Party committees.

So far it cannot be said that the Party Committees have risen to the challenge. Many economic and Party leaders still do not understand (or reject) the idea of electing personnel. This negative attitude to elections takes various forms. Members of management, while putting forward "the interests of the common cause," induce undesirable candidates to withdraw by promising favours or by threats. Attempts are made to force people to vote for the desired candidate "in line with Party discipline." If the work force elects a different person than the one recommended by the management, then, say the opponents of democratization, the collective is "immature."

I think the reverse is the case: a collective is "immature" (there are unfortunately many such collectives) if it has failed to realize its new rights and is timid in exercising these rights. After all, we are only learning how to live and work in conditions of genuine democracy. And we will learn. There is no doubt that the forthcoming 19th All-Union Party conference will provide an important lesson.

In the three years of perestroika and revolutionary change in our society, we have accumulated more new experience, both positive and negative, than ever before. The forthcoming forum will draw on this experience. ■

DRAWING UPON EACH OTHER'S EXPERIENCE

What is the attitude in Poland toward the changes under way in the Soviet Union? The prominent Polish political scientist, Prof. **Artur Bodnar** gave his point of view to New Times Warsaw correspondent Professor Rudolf Borecki. Prof. Bodnar is widely known for his writing on current affairs. In his appearances on TV and Radio and his articles, controversial and sometimes contentious for the press, he raises issues that evoke a lively response from various sections of Polish society.

A. Bodnar. Restructuring in the Soviet Union is undoubtedly a revolution, if you consider its historic significance. But restructuring in the U.S.S.R. is a protracted process. It follows from the proceedings of the 27th CPSU Congress that it will continue for 10-15 years. Its revolutionary dimension should therefore be interpreted as a dynamic accumulation of qualitative changes leading to an entirely new condition of society. That is how the process was described by Mikhail Gorbachev at the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in February. On the other hand, I would say that this is a controlled, planned revolution. When the most progressive and farsighted section of society initiates radical changes in the economy, culture, and education, as well as in the public mind, this amounts to a directed revolution that begins above all within the party and bodies of government so as to extend to all spheres of public life at a later stage.

R. Borecki. In your latest article you point to the ideological and educational significance of the "open policy of the Soviet leadership." That policy of openness, sincerity and truth runs up against various barriers in the public mind when it is applied in practice. It is a fact that part of our society, albeit a steadily diminishing one, is still in the grip of old stereotypes. It is enough to recall readers' letters widely published in our press, which to a certain extent reflect public opinion at large, for instance, the letter written by Nina Andreyeva to the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossia, in which she says that she cannot abandon her principles.

A.B. The phenomenon that you are discussing has historical and psychological roots. Some people tend to lean on old familiar ways even if they are likely to be worse off as a result. That is something that has been known in sociology for a long time. My own view is that such an attitude is adopted by generations whose social activity is on the wane.

The bold and self-critical assessment of the events of the past that your party has undertaken is of profound importance, above all because it prevents the repetition of past mistakes and performs a profoundly significant educational function. In that policy I see a great deal of concern for the younger generation and an effort to instil in it sound thinking and lofty moral values so that it will occupy a worthy place in society. That policy is characterized by a humane and wise vision of the future, and concern for the nation and the future of socialism.

R.B. What is the significance of the Polish experience for the Soviet Union? I mean the political experience of the past few years described in your country as a period of socialist renewal.

A.B. The first conclusion to be drawn from the Polish experience is that the process of restructuring all spheres of life in society is an extremely complex and protracted one. Poland is about to complete the seventh year of its renewal, which began at the 9th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in 1981, and no one would dare say now that we are entering the final phase of renewal.

Poland has always been a country where various political and world views interact or clash with each other. My view is that this situation has a significance that is not confined to Poland. A bitter political struggle is under way, and at times we lack the experience of democracy in resolving social contradictions — and I mean contradictions that do not bear directly on the interests of the state or the foundations of socialism. Such views are given ample space in the media and, having created the appropriate conditions for an open debate, we try to argue against them as part of a candid discussion, or, if these views make sense, we try to heed them. The grain of truth that these views carry must be used for the benefit of social progress.

Another conclusion to be drawn from the Polish experience has to do with the growing interdependence of the world today, something that has been emphasized on many occasions by Mikhail Gorbachev. Poland owes big debts to the West. It owes a great deal of money to the socialist countries as well. That situation is fraught with the risk of political pressure being brought to bear on us, and the possibility of alleviating the debt burden. On many occasions we have experienced political pressure from the West, while our friends and above all the Soviet Union, have tried to help us bear the burden of debt. One imperative of the current irreversible process under way inter-

nationally is that we become better at coexisting in an open world that is growing increasingly interdependent and complex.

The Polish experience also confirms the profound wisdom of Lenin, who said that the future of socialism cannot be painted in one colour or be perceived as uniform. The universal values of socialism as an ideology and socio-economic formation exist in a specific national medium, and adapt themselves to and interact with the history and traditions of every nation. Having asserted itself on the soil of one or other country, socialism cannot but acquire some of the national traits of that country. It was believed at one time that national traits stand in the way of building socialism. It appears now that a different approach is called for; we must be united when we come under attack, when socialism is in jeopardy, and when we speak of a united world communist movement, but we must have the right to differ from each other in pursuing our common goals.

Every nation and every socialist state is acting under its own specific conditions and this goes as much for relations within the socialist community as for relations with nations that have a different social system. I was greatly impressed to read in a recent editorial in Kommunist that the time has come to speak realistically and truthfully of the nations of the socialist community and look at both the strong and weak aspects of their present-day development. Otherwise we will revert to the dangerous practice of "success propaganda."

There is one more extremely important implication of Lenin's idea of historical diversity. Every socialist state has its own historically evolved place in Europe and the world at large, and is different from any other. It appears to be necessary and expedient to use this situation for the good of our community. Every socialist nation must make its own contribution to international politics. One example is the initiatives of Wojciech Jaruzelski, which were rated highly by the Soviet Union and other socialist nations.

And finally, the Polish experience indicates how dramatic the process of breaking down outmoded and solidified stereotypes of socialism can be.



Mikhail Gorbachev' book "Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and for the Whole World" is a best seller in Warsaw.

Polish political scientists are closely studying the changes that are taking place in the minds of young people and examining their needs, aspirations and attitudes to socialism. One quite often hears young Poles favour socialist theory, but reject real socialism. We also bear in mind that a large section of the young in Poland are Catholics and it is therefore of great importance that we get a better idea of how they combine a Catholic world view with understanding the laws of social development that follow logically from Marxism-Leninism. In Poland one can observe these two different world views coexist quite successfully in the public mind and in day-to-day behavior. This phenomenon calls for closer study by psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, and Marxist social scientists.

R.B. The policy of dramatically reforming all spheres of our life, clearing it of past injustice, abuse of office, ostentation, and double standards serves to reassert moral values in the public mind and seeks to reassert social justice. That is something so frequently repeated that it may sound banal. Where then do the opponents of moral renewal come from? What does the Polish experience suggest?

Let us not consider here our ideological opponents, who are rubbed up the wrong way by anything that serves to improve socialism, but rather look at those who have their own interpretation of how the potential opened up by democratization can be used and who take advantage of the policy of openness for their personal gain. Let us discuss the ways of those who for the sake of individual or group interests, or egoistic ambition to gain something under the new set of circumstances, consciously or unconsciously jeopardize the destiny of our common cause and play into the hands of the opponents of restructuring.

A.B. As an individual I am greatly surprised by those in your country who, while acting ostensibly in favour of restructuring, in fact do a great deal of harm to it. As a political scientist I am of course aware that broad democratization inevitably has to cope with the carry-over from the past.

As democratization and openness increasingly take the place of methods of administration by injunction, reassert the law, and open up new channels for self-expression, they at times also expose deep-rooted social, ethnic and other contradictions. This is where high standards of civic responsibility and political awareness as well as common sense and intuition must perform their function, and demonstrate that any manifestation of individual or group egoism cuts both ways under the circumstances. Aspirations of that nature stand in the way of broad democratization and, albeit inadvertently, facilitate the spreading of the dangerous notion of the immaturity of the public mind or "reasonable limits" to openness.

Poles are familiar with a whole spectrum of such phenomena, ranging from brinkmanship to provocations aimed at subverting the process of democratization and socialist renewal. Our own bitter experience can be useful. We learn from history that every process of social renewal is accompanied by a political struggle.

R.B. Negative experience is sometimes no less useful than positive experience, because both indicate a way to the truth.

Warsaw



Shifts of emphases

Evolution of Chinese foreign policy in the eighties

EVGENY BAZHANOV

The foreign policy platform of the recent 13th CPC Congress was distinguished by its terseness. "China will unswervingly continue to adhere," the congress was told, "to its peaceful and independent foreign policy and establish relations of friendship and cooperation with countries, based on the five principles peaceful coexistence. Together with peace-loving countries and nations the world over, we shall make every effort to ensure that the international situation develops in a direction favourable to all the peoples on earth and to world peace." Furthermore, the congress welcomed the reaching of the Soviet-American treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, and the improvement in the climate of East-West relations. It was pointed out at the same time that only the first step toward arms reduction had been made, that not a single "hot spot" had been removed, and that "there was still a long, hard and even tortuous way to go" before genuine détente was achieved.

On the whole, the congress documents reflected the essence of the new Chinese strategy: the P.R.C.'s foreign policy today aims at strengthening peace and cooperation in the international arena. But what are the immediate objectives of Chinese diplomacy and the content of its activity in various specific directions? What are the factors determining the P.R.C.'s line in world politics, and, finally, what are the prospects for its foreign policy?

In answering these questions I could, of course, confine myself to enumerating basic aspects of Chinese policy, illustrate them with a few facts and quotations, and let it go at that. I am convinced, though, that the time has come for a more profound analysis of the significant evolution that China's strategy in world affairs has undergone in the eighties. The little that has been written on this subject is not free of stereotypes. The present level of Soviet-Chinese relations calls for a new

look at the problem. Moreover, updating our notions of Chinese strategy is essential to the restructuring of our foreign policy thinking.

Objectives revised

Let us look back at the now remote year of 1982, when the CPC held its 12th Congress. The congress formally endorsed China's new foreign policy strategy, which developed and deepened in the subsequent years. The changes announced could then be summed up as follows:

– The proposition to the effect that the Soviet Union was "the principal source of the danger of a new world war threatening all countries, including the U.S.A." was discarded.

– The objective of coming out in a united worldwide front, which would include the United States, against "Soviet hegemonism" was abandoned. Instead, it was announced that the P.R.C. was conducting an independent foreign policy, was aligned with no major power or group of states, would not enter into an alliance with them, and would not yield to pressure on the part of any major power.

– China announced that it sought normal relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence principles with all countries – including both superpowers, i.e., the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

– Emphasis was laid on the importance China attached to the developing countries in its foreign policy.

– Readiness to normalize relations with foreign Communist parties was voiced for the first time for years. Four principles – independence, full equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs – were suggested as the basis for these relations.

– The objective of the country's foreign policy was defined as "creating an international environment favourable to a lasting world peace which would enable China to apply all its energies to socialist construction." The congress emphasized that the P.R.C. was objectively interested in disarmament and détente, and that it believed the safeguarding of peace and the prevention of a global conflict to be possible.

The Chinese leadership's position retained some of its previous propositions, however. For instance, the struggle for peace was inseparably linked with the opposition to "hegemonism by the two superpowers." The difference in China's approaches to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. remained. The Soviet Union was accused of putting the security of the P.R.C. in "serious jeopardy," without removing which Soviet-Chinese relations could allegedly not, it was said, be normalized. By that the Chinese side meant the so-called "three obstacles": Soviet assistance to the Indo-Chinese states, Soviet policy in Afghanistan, and the deployment of our troops on the P.R.C. border and in Mongolia.

But, for all that, Chinese policy underwent striking changes. The P.R.C. changed over from confrontation to rapprochement and cooperation in the world arena. What was behind this turn? Without answering this question, it is impossible to understand either the magnitude of the changes, the meaning of what followed, or the outlook for the future.

The chief reason for the revision of the P.R.C.'s foreign policy strategy was, in my opinion, that the previous line had been incompatible with the tasks of modernizing the economy and building socialism. The 3rd plenary meeting of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation (December 1978) set the nation the task of modernization and the all-out development of the productive forces. The record of subsequent years has shown that the solution of domestic problems calls for the appropriate external conditions: the toning down of disputes with foreign countries and a calmer situation on the P.R.C.'s borders. Modernization called for diversifying foreign economic links (China at the time did most of its foreign trade with the capitalist world). It appeared only logical to extend partnership to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The need for cooperation with the socialist world increased as the negative consequences of contacts with the West accumulated. Economically, China suffered from the instability of the world capitalist market, and its Western partners' inability or unwillingness to meet the P.R.C.'s vital requirements. Ideological and social problems arose as well: the Chinese press sounded the alarm over the spread of bourgeois liberalism among Communists, and admiration for capitalism, its ideological trends and political system among some intellectuals and young people.

Whereas the policy of socialist modernization created the objective prerequisites for the P.R.C.'s gradual abandonment of its former line, the rise of contradictions in Sino-American relations probably gave an immediate impulse to a revision of China's strategy, and expedited developments that were clearly inevitable. It was pointed out in Beijing that after the Reagan administration took office, Washington assumed an increasingly defiant manner, trying to treat the P.R.C. as "a junior subordinate partner," and use China as a "card" in the strategy of deterring the Soviet Union. Tension between the two sides over Taiwan, as well as in the economic and ideological spheres, continued to grow.

China resented the White House's aggressive expansionist behavior in the international arena. Close relations with the U.S. cost the P.R.C. political losses in the developing world and in the international communist movement. The change in strategy was caused, among other factors, by the aggravation of the global situation: it was pointed out in the Chinese capital that the danger of war had increased and that China could become involved in a major conflict against its will. In Beijing's opinion, the "superpowers" had "switched roles," with the U.S. now on the offensive, and the U.S.S.R. only defending itself. In that case, the Chinese reasoned, why should they be on Washington's side?

From theory to practice

The directives of the 12th CPC Congress initiated a change in policy which, however, came about gradually, and in the teeth of conflicting views; there were deep-rooted preconceived notions to overcome, and long-standing conflicts to resolve.

As far as America was concerned, the changes manifested themselves in the toughening of the Chinese stand on disputable issues and in the P.R.C.'s distancing itself from the U.S. in the international arena. Beijing stopped following American strategic suggestions, and emphasized the independence of its foreign policy line ever more persistently. Having ceased to identify with Washington's policy in matters of disarmament and international security, China began to come out vigorously for peace and détente and to put forward its own disarmament

proposals. The P.R.C. criticized the U.S. for its policy in the Middle East, southern Africa, the Korean peninsula, Western Europe and Central America, for trampling upon the economic interests of young nations, etc. It opposed manifestations of Japanese militarism and revanchism, and political moves on the part of a number of West European states – Britain and Holland, for instance – prejudicial to Chinese interests.

At the same time, Soviet-Chinese relations registered a certain improvement. In the autumn of 1982, agreement was reached on holding political consultations between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. In the same year, the volume of bilateral commodity turnover grew by 50 per cent, and the countries exchanged delegations for the first time after a long interval. Beijing started expanding contacts with all the socialist countries (except Vietnam), and restoring links with most Communist and Workers' parties. The CPC announced that the nature of its relations with foreign Communist parties was in no way dependent on how close those parties were to the CPSU. The Communist Party of China admitted it had made mistakes with regard to other parties in the past, with all the ensuing negative consequences.

The Chinese leadership made vigorous efforts to strengthen the P.R.C.'s position in the developing world. China stepped up its cooperation with the non-aligned movement, and the Group of 77, and made arrangements to get South-South cooperation under way. Contacts with the ASEAN countries were extended, and the attitude to India adjusted. Relations with a number of progressive states and movements (Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, the African National Congress, and others) were improved.

While changing many of its foreign policy parameters, China did not want to damage its relations with the West. In 1983-84, the P.R.C. wrested important political and economic concessions from the United States and its allies. Relations between the sides stabilized and assumed a new quality. Contacts developed in various spheres, military included.

Having secured its rear in this way, the Chinese leadership made further approaches to socialist countries. At the June 1983 session of the National People's Congress, it was recognized for the first time in years that East European countries were building socialism. On October 1 of the same year, a top Chinese leader referred directly to these states as socialist. Trade and economic links between the P.R.C. and Eastern Europe were put on a contractual basis. Ivan Arkhipov, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, visited the P.R.C. in December 1984.



A new international telecommunication centre in Beijing.

Nevertheless, no balance was achieved in the P.R.C.'s relations with West and East – specifically, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This was only partly due to the fact that China's links with the capitalist world were closer and more varied. The chief obstacle consisted in the Chinese capital still regarding the Soviet Union as "No. 1 threat" to the P.R.C.'s national security. The Chinese leadership still demanded that the U.S.S.R. remove the "three obstacles." No such preconditions were set either to the United States, or to any other country.

The reaction to Soviet perestroika

Recently Chinese foreign policy has begun to show more changes – specifically, as regards the Soviet Union and interrelations within the framework of the so-called "big triangle" (the U.S.S.R. – the U.S.A. – the P.R.C.), problems of global security and disarmament, and some regional conflicts. Before citing concrete examples, I shall try to ascertain the reasons for these changes.

It appears that they largely manifest a reaction to perestroika in the U.S.S.R. First of all, the P.R.C. has not failed to notice our efforts to restructure international relations, and the constructiveness and flexibility of Soviet initiatives in various fields. In a Los Angeles Times interview last December, Huan Xiang, the leading Chinese politologist, said that the current line of the Soviet leadership is "an important new factor having an effect on China's foreign policy." In the Chinese press one comes across statements to the effect that the CPSU "is giving a fairly realistic and sober-minded" analysis to the international situation, and that the Soviet leadership "has made considerable headway in the all-round readjustment of its foreign policy." The objectives the Soviet Union pursues in the world arena are described as being "to promote dialogue, ease confrontation, attain stability and build up an atmosphere of détente." One reads in the Chinese papers that "Soviet foreign policy is undergoing certain changes of a strategic character,"

Chinese radio reporters in Volgograd.

and that "the U.S.S.R. has reached a historic turning point." Some papers call attention to the fact that the Soviet Union has put forward dozens of peace initiatives over the past few years. The Shanghai weekly Shijie jingji daobao voiced the opinion, in August 1987, that changes had taken place in all basic aspects of Soviet strategy in the world arena: in its views on the nuclear age, problems of defence, the capitalist countries, the developing world, and so on. A similar analysis is to be found in an article by the diplomat Gong Dafei carried by the magazine Shijie zhishi. The author of the article comes to the conclusion that in its foreign and home policy the Soviet leaders are carrying out "a new revolution..." whose global importance "is not to be underestimated."

Second, it merits special comment that China welcomes the CPSU's stand on the question of relationships between socialist countries and Communist parties. The Soviet Union, many articles stress, is of the opinion that each country has specific conditions and interests, that it has the absolute right to decide on its own methods of building socialism, and that no one can monopolize the truth. Addressing the first session of the National People's Congress (the 7th convocation) Li Peng, then still acting Premier of the P.R.C. State Council, pointed out: "We have taken into consideration the Soviet state's statement of the need for the strict fulfilment of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between socialist countries."

Third, the Soviet initiatives aimed at improving Soviet-Chinese relations, voiced by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech on July 28, 1986, have also had an effect on the evolution of foreign policy thinking in Beijing. He publicly reaffirmed readiness for a Soviet-Chinese meeting at any level; suggested that the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. discuss concrete measures for a proportional reduction in ground forces; voiced a desire for cooperation in carrying out plans for socio-economic development, and the pooling of experience; and said that the U.S.S.R. was interested in joining hands with China in tapping the resources of the Amur River. In the Vladivostok speech the Soviet leader also pointed to the possibility of expanding economic links between border areas, stressed that the official border between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. could pass along the main fairway of the Amur, and outlined Soviet initiatives with regard to the problems associated with what is described in the P.R.C. as the "three obstacles." Mikhail Gorbachev announced a reduction in the Soviet military presence in Mongolia and a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and said the Soviet Union was interested in the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations.

The Chinese leadership made an official response to the Vladivostok initiatives. "We appreciate and attach great importance to the pronouncements by General Secretary Gorbachev regarding China and Sino-Soviet relations... The Chinese side takes note of the fact that they contain certain points not mentioned before... We welcome this." The P.R.C. showed special interest in those parts of the speech dealing with the establishment of the border along the Amur fairway, with the Soviet troops in Mongolia and Afghanistan, and with economic cooperation between the two sides.

The subsequent steps taken by the Soviet government, its readiness to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles from Asia, and the decision to withdraw all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, have not passed unnoticed in China. The latest session of the National People's Congress stated the following in this connection: "Certain progress has been made of late towards the solution of the Afghanistan problem."

Finally, the fact that both countries are now tackling identical domestic problems is of great importance for Soviet-Chinese relations and, consequently, for China's foreign policy as a whole. Although differences in certain concrete methods of economic policy remain, they are no longer, and cannot be, cause for alienation of any kind. On the contrary, there are common goals which lay substantial groundwork for cooperation and for the study of each other's experience. It is not for nothing that the P.R.C. thinks highly of the Soviet leadership's domestic policy. In an interview granted to the Italian paper L'Unita in November 1987, Hu Qili, a member of the Permanent Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, said, for instance: "We sincerely hope the Soviet reform will be a success. We are following closely the reform experiments in the U.S.S.R. and in other socialist countries." Some Chinese commentators believe that the appeal of socialist ideals to peoples across the world will depend precisely on whether the Soviet reforms are a success. Chinese press commentators have come to the conclusion that the reforms are a historic example for the entire socialist world to follow, and that this is the only way in which socialism can finally gain the upper hand over the capitalist system.

(To be concluded)

Photos by Xinhua agency and TASS

Just three films in two decades. Years of struggling to reach audiences, crowned with success and recognition thanks to the renewal in this country. These are the milestones in the career of film director Alexei Gherman ("Trials on the roads," "Twenty days without war," "My friend Ivan Lapshin").

ALEXEI GHERMAN:

Let's face the truth

The ideological battles waged in Russia in the middle of the last century over ways to social and moral reform roduced an expression, "to succumb to e environment." To change the world or change man? To what extent does an depend on circumstances, on the nvironment? To what extent is a person xposed to adversity responsible for his her actions? The argument about freeom of choice has lost none of its relevance today.

It is not surprising that it cropped up at e very beginning of our talk with Alexei herman. Critics and cinema-goers have ng noted the attention he pays to the rcumstances in which his characters e, and his attention to detail. However, wanted to talk not about his stylistic inovations, but about his message and ilosophy of life for which these innovaons provide such a convincing vehicle.

The year was 1935. Many people beved and still believe that it marked a g-awaited turn for the better in ople's living conditions. But the life we e in "My friend Ivan Lapshin" is anyng but comfortable: we see a squalid cold world of communal flats in which certain basic human ties have been distorted or broken altogether: a child does not see mother, husbands are separated from wives, there are no families at all. People live in a hostel-like environment: men, a child, a house-maid; the boy has ugly, jug ears; the woman who embodies the romantic theme in the film has a coarse, raucous voice. The stern hero of the film, court investigator Lapshin, cries in his bed at night.

What was the message of the scrupulously detailed portrayal of the "environment," the sordid living conditions? Pondering on this question led me (perhaps logically) to Vampilov's play "Duck hunt" which meticulously reproduces the hopeless, bleak atmosphere of a provincial town in which the hero is drinking himself to an untimely death. But this Vampilov play is set in the late sixties. In both cases we see man treated as a stepson by history.

While not rejecting my analogies, Gherman said he would prefer to talk not about "man and the environment," but "man and circumstances." As regards the "environment," he only has as much environment in his films as is necessary to understand the circumstances in which people live and make their choices and decisions:

– Isn't that why film officials formerly felt such a dislike of films that abounded in factual detail? This may be why they found my manner so irritating. One cinema boss in those days said of my film "Trials on the roads" that while mistakes could be found in every war picture, this film was remarkable because it was guilty of all the mistakes ever made in all film trends. It was then that the phrase "texture gone mad" was launched. But I was not just piling on details in my films, every detail was carefully thought out. Every detail had to carry a poignant message. In "My friend Ivan Lapshin" I juxtaposed two characters: an intellectual, the writer Khanin, and a detective, Ivan Lapshin. Lapshin's horizons are limited in some ways. For all that he is keenly aware of the nature of his time, he feels that the ground is shaking under people's feet, that something is wrong and that terrible things are in the offing. That's why he cries at night. But our intellectual writer feels and understands nothing. He wants to look like a Cheka man, a militiaman. Why should a writer want to look like a militiaman, wear high boots and a leather raglan and a detective's hat? This is a mystery to me... But I did not invent all these details. They were important for me not for their own sake, but as testimony to the times when people were enthusiastic and starry-eyed.

Something of the real atmosphere of life at the time is conveyed by the jokes constantly exchanged by the militiamen

in my film: "I'll put you in jail, you'll put me in jail, if you put me in jail, I'll put you in jail. I'll have you sent to exile in Solovki, I'll write a denunciation on you." These facetious but uncomfortably realistic threats do not seem to worry anyone or put them on their guard. They are a part of the way of life.

A lot of gruesome and harrowing facts about the thirties have now come to light. But what do the young people of today think about that period? Many of them believe – and "Lapshin" was mainly seen by young people – that the people who lived at the time were strangely depraved. But is that so? People could not live in constant fear, they had to believe in something, and believe they did... My father quite seriously told me that a war with Hitler was impossible because the workers of the world would all rise in our support... Faith in the reasonable logic of circumstances and sequence of events (determined by those whose job it was to do so), faith that could not be shaken by any hard facts – this was the phenomenon of the time that intrigued me most when I was working on "Lapshin." It still intrigues me.

– But surely you want not only to identify the phenomenon, but to discover its well springs, to trace its sources? Why was it, for example, that the son of Marshal Blucher continued to believe in Stalin even after the arrest of his father and mother which shook him greatly? Why does your intellectual hero, like dozens, even hundreds of educated and thinking people, prefer uncritical faith in a utopia to an unblinkered view of life? Is it because "uplifting lies are dearer to us than the dark of lowly truths"? Yet that line of Pushkin's was directed against philistines who valued "a pot in a stove" above truth and poetry... But here we are talking about the artistic intelligentsia whose business at all times has been not to believe but to think, to understand the world, its own position and the position of its people. Why was it so blind and ready for compromise at that period in history?

– To my mind, the fatal self-delusion for which people had to pay so high a price is to be attributed to the dizzying changes in the nation's life. Read the recently published notes about Stalin the writer Konstantin Simonov wrote on his deathbed. Young people in the thirties were born and reared with a powerful faith in the revolution. They matured in an atmosphere of struggle and they were used to making sacrifices for their faith. Were they capable of sober analysis when such analysis was badly needed? "I was shielded against it by my ideas about the Red Army." I quote Simonov and his vivid document of the period, "The Red Army which would win all future battles. I had been in love with the army from childhood, and I was protected by beliefs about the five-year plan which was to open up a future without which life was felt to be impossible."

Incidentally, Simonov entitled his notes "Through the eyes of a man of my generation." This means he was aware of the responsibility he was assuming when he talked on behalf of his generation. Elsewhere in these notes he confesses: "For a 22- or 23-year-old, what was happening in 1937-38, and seems incredible and monstrous today, gradually became a norm; one almost got accustomed to it. You lived in the midst of it all like a deaf man; it was as if you had not heard that there were shootings and killings all around you, and that people were disappearing."

If people had not looked away from the truth they would have had to recognize the reality of it all; they would have had to recognize that collectivization had involved some tragic mistakes, and that Stalin ought to have been replaced: many, perhaps the majority, were unable to face up to this truth.

– They could only do so after the 20th Party Congress.

– What happened among intellectuals after the 20th Congress is equally astonishing. My father, Yuri Gherman, was a better writer before he began handing out advice to his readers. Oddly enough, the 20th Congress had a crippling effect on him as a writer because he suddenly became terribly involved in the life of the state and came to believe in everything so uncritically and romantically that he began to teach everyone. Art never forgives that... And gradually the screws were tightened and people began to change again.

– By analogy, are you not suggesting that artists and intellectuals today, for example, film makers in the wake of the 5th Congress of Film Makers which launched a reform in our cinema and restored criteria of justice, are also in danger of letting their artistic standards slip?

– Strange things are happening in our cinema. After the 5th Congress of Film Makers gave great creative freedom to artists, one might have expected a spate of excellent pictures. But this did not happen. Why this is so is a mystery to me... It's a paradox: you can film anything. You are allowed to tell the truth outloud. But we have discovered that when "anything goes" many artists are at a loss. They become immersed in organizational problems. Everyone has an itch to organize... But films are not being made. Now that an individual approach and untrammelled intellect are so highly prized, it is the "diligent" people who are making films. They are worthy people, but they work with time-tested themes and material.

The flood of trash on which several generations of cinema-goers have been reared continues unabated. Today this is not even commercial cinema, but childish films for grown-ups. How can we talk about the responsibility of the artist when we see films brazenly and unashamedly pandering to the lowest tastes?

We in the U.S.S.R. used to enjoy a kind of advantage over Western film makers. In the West, the producer counted every penny and never gave the director more than was absolutely necessary. In this country, you could shoot a film and not worry about the cost. But the way things are going now, film makers are supposed to be more concerned about distribution than the distributors themselves. I find it an alarming symptom when artists think too much about distribution and vie with each other for box office success. It happens that directors applying for a permit to make a film write, we hope to get 30-35 million viewers for this film and 20-25 million for that one. In this way audiences are divided into categories, and labels are stuck on them. But is such a simplistic and pragmatic approach to man and the mission of culture any less dangerous

A still from "My friend Ivan Lapshin"

than the vulgar political approach which killed art, artists and audiences in the years of the Stalin cult and in the period of stagnation?

– But your films, like the films of Tenghiz Abuladze, Andrei Tarkovsky and some other excellent films which have been taken off the shelf, have not been box-office hits. Cinema attendance is falling.

– Cinema attendance is falling all over the world. This is a general trend. I see nothing tragic in the fact that only 10 million and not 30 million people want to see a good, serious, thought-provoking and challenging film. Even the most popular books today are read by millions and not by tens of millions.

We are witnessing a great distortion of values which obscures the genuine processes taking place in our culture and impedes the study of these processes. Labels are stuck not only on viewers, but also on artists. You are an artist for the masses, and I am an artist for the elite. But art is not divided into popular and elitist, but only into good and bad. It may be a terrible thing to say, but the quality and artistic standard of a film are not measured by the number of people who have seen it. This is not to say that the problem of entertainment in cinema and in art generally does not exist.

I can give you an example. As a boy, I lived in the settlement of Polyarny (my father was a war correspondent with the Northern Fleet). It had a good theatre company which produced Isidor Shtok's play about submariners. I remember that the submarine crews left the hall in droves in the middle of the play. My father asked his old friend, Admiral Starikov, why they were leaving, and he said: "I'm back from a mission, my submarine lay on the sea bottom and I was suffocating, and now I take my girl to see a play and you show me my submarine lying on the sea bottom and myself suffocating."

Of course, people need to be entertained and diverted, just as they need to rest. But why should we deliberately stupefy people?

In general, we are all clever with hindsight. Looking at the flood of cinema and TV productions I can't help feeling that we are far more exacting and critical towards the past then towards ourselves. But the question of the responsibility of the artist is still on the agenda. And if we turn our critical gaze from the past to the present, what do we present-day aritsts have to show for ourselves?

– You have once said that you can only make films when you are under pressure. Could this lie at the root of the artist's difficulties today? Isn't it the reason why some artists are silent? Let me elaborate. For years all kinds of strictures and bans stifled art and impeded its growth. Artists found themselves "directed" and "guided" and goaded. "Closer to life, closer to life!" they were told, pushing them further and further away from life. But these artificial obstacles – my logic may shock some people – created just the kind of difficulties on which some artists thrived. And now that these obstacles have been removed and there is only the overwhelming and most formidable challenge of life in all its complexity, you no longer gain plaudits by just touching on a taboo subject. One needs truly profound insight, dedication to the truth, and hard work in order to understand life. A starry-eyed, romantic intellectual like your Khanin is incapable of that. Such a challenge can only be met by an artist who is as independent and ruthless in telling the truth as Robespierre.

Are you shooting anything at present, and if so, what?

– Like many of my colleagues, I am at a crossroads. I am writing a scenario from the Strugatsky brothers' story "It is hard to be God." But I cannot say for sure whether I will film it. Perhaps my new film will be based on the prose of Yuri Trifonov. In general the answer to your question and the way out of the strange artistic crisis in our cinema lies in an honest reappraisal of the lessons of the past. We should be ready to draw lessons, no matter how harsh they are.

This is what is happening today in all areas of life, including the cinema. I have in mind the recent documentary films which are trying to fill in the "blank spots" in our history. There is a huge demand for this: people are thirsting to know the truth. But the way it is being done is somehow disappointing. Why? Let me try to explain. Supposing old newsreels which have been lying on the shelf for decades are released, newsreels which probably hold the key to understanding the historical truth (like a secret door behind a canvass in a fairy tale). But something prevents us from approaching that door. Haven't you ever felt that something was standing in your way? I wonder if it is the music, which envelopes these priceless frames so tediously while you want to stop the frames and gaze at them. But the frames flicker past and the music does its job – in counterpoint or in unison – and you begin to understand why you find it a hindrance: again you are being offered not only a certain version of history, but you are being offered the all-too-familiar approach to history – I mean the romantic view of history. Of course, this is being done differently than in former times, from a new standpoint, in the spirit of present-day thinking, but the familiar notes, the "Khanin" enthusiasm and complacency can be detected... I can even note a new complacency.

(At this point it occurred to me that this was perhaps why the cinema officials of the past were so allergic to Gherman's "manner." For he had started the work of deglamourizing our history, a challenge that even today not everyone is able and ready to meet.)

To my last question he had this to say:

– For drastic change to occur in art, including cinema, we have to wait for a new generation of directors who have not been battered by life to come along. The most hideous censors are within ourselves. The young people who are following us do not, honestly, seem to be very promising. I don't want to be misunderstood. Nothing is further from my mind than to give a sweeping assessment of a whole generation of young artists. I refer to trends and certain symptoms which I find disturbing. It seems to me that some young people are even more cowardly than we were because they were rapped over the knuckles early on in their careers. But this is my personal opinion.

We need a free, independently-minded person whose consciousness is not steeped in dogma, who has not been brought up to worship idols, a person who does not put his faith in God, or in Satan, nor even in "the state" as an abstract force, but only in himself and his own potential. Such a person will be able to assume responsibility and heave the whole load of History onto his shoulders. Man, help Thyself. Perhaps this will be the message of my next film..

Interviewed by
YEKATERINA KOZHUKHOVA

Even bad books are worth reading

they, too, have a story to tell



Consider the options open to a young and aspiring author whose first novel has been turned down by publishers. Having found themselves in this all-too-familiar situation, some would work on their style, others would shelve their first novel and proceed to write another, and others again would blame the "dark forces that have taken over national culture" for their failure, and take up politics. The author we have in mind takes the third-named line of action and discovers that he is much better at politics than at writing. Having learnt to manoeuvre between political factions, he moves on to top party posts and discovers that publishers are now quite willing to give him a try, but by that time our author is no longer interested in fiction. He would rather give his own views in writing. A party functionary and politician, he has great respect for the word. He is in favour of the social contract. He signs long letters to acclaimed writers urging them to write works of true art on appended topics. He has reached the stage where he alone decides what is fit to print and what is fit to be shelved. His name is known to everyone in his country, but he prefers to precede it with his newly-acquired title of Imperial Minister of Education and Propaganda.

The works of Joseph Goebbels were not destined to become the subject of literary studies. His writings were scrutinized by the principal prosecutors at the Nuremberg trial. The author did not live to hear qualified analyses of the merits or otherwise of his works, he committed suicide. Until his dying day he dictated his diary, which was published in part during his lifetime, and in part, after World War II. The first book compiled from his diaries "Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei" gives the official version of the Nazis rise to power. Written in a clipped emphatic style, it articulates Goebbels' new esthetic manifesto: The German art of the next few decades will either be heroic, steely, romantic, matter-of-fact and devoid of sentiment, national and full of great pathos, universal, binding and cohesive, or it will not exist at all.

I saw the novel "Michael" just republished, and hastily translated into English in a Geneva book store.

Even a cursory look at the 130-page piece of writing shows that the verdict of the worldly editors of Weimar Germany was correct. It is no more than an exercise in stilted prose bearing the unmistakable imprint of a young author of little talent out to startle the world. Why has it been resurrected from the oblivion where it certainly so comfortably belongs? Was it perhaps because of the name of the author, whose personality is something psychoanalysists would love to get a glimpse of? The English-language edition of "Michael" is prefaced with an inspiring foreword by the historian David Irwing, who has no doubt at all that Goebbels was a "tender, introspective patriot." He regards the persecutions of nazis as Zionist conspiracy and demands that the U.S. Department of Justice special investigations division, engaged in tracking down nazi criminals, be closed.

It would of course be the easiest thing in the world to censure those who have now published the novel for playing up to the "Hitler wave" in mass culture, but that would be a rash thing to do. The novel is clearly the production of a man of small intellect. The author relies heavily on borrowed ideas spun around a primitive plot. Written as a diary – Goebbels favoured that genre – it tells the story of a man who comes home from World War I, enters Heidelberg University, lives through the economic depression, becomes a miner, and finally dies in a mine. Unexpectedly, though, this bad book proves useful reading, not only from the point of view of understanding the author's personality, which is after all, something of purely forensic interest, but also because it provides an insight into the cultural and psychological origins of fascism.

One discerns in the novel the pseudo-socialist ideas upon which the nazi leaders capitalized in the 1920s: "We are all soldiers in the revolution of labour. We want the victory of labour over money." Western plutocracy and bankers are censured: "Germany gives in and sells out to the capitalist West. A horrible prospect: Germany's sons will bleed to death on the battlefields of Europe as the mercenaries of capitalism."

Nationalist doctrine figures prominently in the novel: "Today there is only one calling for a young German: to stand up for the Fatherland. The alien rabble must leave German art. The fate of German art is our own good German concern."

Some of the monologues are very similar to the future speeches of the head of the Berlin party organization and the propaganda department. "If we carry out our task – and we must carry it out – then Germany will reshape the world. When these bowed heads are raised someday, when these labor-hardened fists are clenched someday, when these weary eyes begin to flash someday, when these millions of throats shout someday: 'Down with the shame! The Fatherland belongs to the man who frees it! Where are our guns?'"

The scene of the protagonist's acquaintance with the future leader of the nation is one of adulation.

"I sit in a room I have never seen. Among people who are alien to me. Poor careworn people. Workers, soldiers, officers, students. This is the German nation after the war. I barely notice someone who suddenly stands in front of the room and bursts into speech. All at once the flow of his speech is unleashed. I am captured, I perk up my ears. The man is gaining tempo. He seems illuminated... He is no speaker. He is a prophet! ...I am reborn at that moment."

I believe that many scientists specializing in the humanities would be well-advised to read "Michael" and the diaries of Goebbels better to understand the origins of the fascist worldview and see what serves as a nutrient medium for it. Goebbels' writings are a valuable source, affording a chance to understand why fascism cannot be considered a passing episode. All that Goebbels had to say can be heard today in any beer hall, or read in books published by those who are concerned about "preserving the national idea," "alien domination," and the trampling of "eternal ideals." What else can one find in the novel? There is hatred of intellectuals ("Intellect has poisoned our nation"), hero and warrior worship ("War is the simplest form of the affirmation of life"), advocacy of violence to deal with opponents, and demands for a return to "folk values" at grassroots and the ousting of "aliens" from national culture.

LEONID MLECHIN

Drawing courtesy of Zeit (F.R.G.)

Geneva-Moscow





OF ARCHITECTURE
EATED

station, a water tower, a
e, rail tracks, locomotives. . .
tsino castle of romantic
ure nearby, framed with
green shrubs, trees, lawns and flower-beds. . . All this is to be seen in the small Moscow apartment of Nikolai Gundorov, a collector and a modeller. His hobby goes back to about 18 years ago when he purchased a toy railway for his son. The toy inspired him to take up modelling in earnest, and his first model was that of a railway station scaled down to almost a hundredth its actual size. A few years later, the model won the first prize at an international competitive display. Before getting down to this "project," which kept him busy for a year and a half, Gundorov had studied a multitude of archive documents and old photographs so as to revive the Moscow circular railway exactly as it was early this century.

Then it occurred to him to reproduce, even though in miniature, the pulled-down monuments of architecture. Gundorov built a model of the Trinity Church in Troitse-Lykovo (dating back to the early 18th century and started on a suburban residence of Empress Catherine II in Tsaritsino. Originally built by the architect Bazhenov as a monument to Russia's victory over Turkey in 1774. This group of structures had proved not to the Empress' liking and was taken apart. Later the architect M. Kazakov was commissioned to build the residence anew. Gundorov set himself the task of reconstructing the palace complex as Bazhenov had conceived it. The modeller gleaned its descriptions from various sources. Now he is finishing the eighth model. Asked about his future plans, Gundorov said: "I hope I'll finish the Tsaritsino complex, which is to comprise 15 models altogether. Also, I consider recreating the model of the Christ the Savior temple in Moscow."





Joy of life.

An old-timer.

Apkalns Ilmars Ekabovič (U.S.S.R.)

The spring's here!

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